

# Javanese Mystical and Marxist Dialectics

Paul Stange, 1970

Time was when man had a heaven, decked and fitted out with endless wealth of thoughts and pictures. The significance of all that is lay in the thread of light by which it was attached to heaven; instead of dwelling in the present as it is here and now, the eye glanced away over the present to the Divine, away, so to say, to a present that lies beyond ... Now we have apparently the need for the opposite of all this; man's mind and interest are so deeply rooted in the earthly that we require a like power to have them raised above that level. His spirit shows such poverty of nature that it seems to long for the mere pitiful feeling of the divine in the abstract, and to get refreshment from that, like a wanderer in the desert craving for the merest mouthful of water. By the little which can thus satisfy the need of the human spirit we can measure the extent of its loss. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p 73

To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from the desire of any individual, however well intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry it out. Otherwise, we shall isolate ourselves from the masses. Unless they are conscious and willing, any kind of work that requires their participation will turn out to be a mere formality and will fail ... There are two principles here: one is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds instead of our making up their minds for them. Mao, *Quotations*, pp 124-125

KEY

SITUATION "UNITY IN DIVERSITY"

Introduction to the thesis and discussion of the limits imposed on the PKI by the historical and social setting of modern Indonesia

MYSTICISM "THE NAIL OF GOD"

Discussion of the classical Javanese notion of power underlying Sukarno's Guided Democracy and its political and ideological limits on the PKI

MARXISM "THE MASS LINE"

The place of the peasantry in the Aidit PKI theory and practice and an evaluation of the PKI as a new link between peasantry and politics

SYNTHESIS "ALL THINGS ARE ONE"

Exploration of the relationship between Marxist and mystical traditions and implications to this history and to historical methodology

## UNITY IN DIVERSITY

Possessed of transcendent truth, both mystics and Marxists deny apparent reality. At the same time, the mystic chooses the path of Being and the Marxist its converse of Becoming. To the mystic the millennium is now and the dimension of time gone - the annihilated ego released for union with a cosmos in which it has always been an unconscious part. The liberation is a return to the primordial purity of the garden with a free spirit which is spontaneous and in tune rather than self-conscious and out of joint. Suffering and evil dissolve along with all dualities; everything makes sense through its relation to everything else. Mind is suspended eternally in a joyful void. Death is faced as an integral part of rather than antithesis to life; it becomes simply one more dissolution of the boundaries between self and other. Time is wiped out since it exists only as a reflex of the human pretention to egoistic immortality, the effort to deny the reality of death. Life is then accepted as merely an eddy in the process of cosmic entropy. With death, suffering, and evil integral to life there is no longer anything to lose and there is everything to gain - then full life is to taste Being as sheer magnificence.

For the Marxist the millennium is not now. It is very much a collective experience of the future rather than an individual vision of the present. The task is to take the mystic awareness that the existing state of reality is not final and to turn that into a tool in the struggle to hurry natural process. History is seen as a mammoth convulsion or folding back of being into itself; dialectical materialism as a mental process equivalent to and revealing the natural process. The object of awareness becomes active transformation rather than passive comprehension. All personal energy is dedicated to the revolution through an ascetic ethic demanding submission of the ego to a humanistic vision of the universal. The religious man, and to the radical the mystic seems one, is seen as a tool of power interests of stasis since his efforts apparently reconcile men to their condition rather than leading them to transform it. So there is a profound divergence of paths despite similar negations of the present reality.

In practice the contrasting tendencies boil down to tactics of unity or conflict, to contrary notions of power and purpose. On the one hand the archetypal hippie whose disregard for the existing state of affairs results in disengagement; on the other hand the radical whose thrust is toward power struggle and an identification with the oppressed.

In Indonesia the difference is essential to understanding the communist attempt to politicize the most mystically suffused portions of the population. My argument here is that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in effect functioned in terms of Javanese mystical rather than Western Marxist notions of power. More specifically, the suggestion is that the Javanization of the PKI resulted from a confluence of socio-economic and ideological factors rather than simply from the limits of the political situation. The effect was to unite the most traditional and most revolutionary currents in common opposition to modern Islam and Western capitalism. At the same time, there was a split within the party between an elite which identified with the last stand of the traditional aristocracy and a mass base which in effect constituted the shattered remnants of that same order. The point is that the elite and mass shared a vocabulary having different implications depending on the perspective taken. This helps explain the tensions leading to the coups and killings of 1965 and 1966.

In making the case, I begin with a sketch of the main historical and social forces before moving into discussion of the classical tradition and its relevance to Sukarno's Guided Democracy. From there to evaluation of the Aidit phase of the PKI and finally to a summation of the relationships between the various traditions. A number of critical conclusions follow. In the first place, I argue that both Javanese and peasant perspectives are fundamental to vision of this history and that those become clear through a dialectical image which simultaneously clarifies structure and process. Then in terms of scholarly method, my suggestion is that an interweaving of subject matter and researcher is essential to insight - in opposition to standard notions of academic neutrality and objective disengagement. From first to last, I stand with the Javanese mystic in his awareness that at base "all things are one" and with the Marxist in arguing that no particular makes sense apart from the whole.

Suharto's current military regime emerged in Indonesia in the wake of obscure coups in Djakarta and the virtually unopposed slaughter of hundreds of thousands in the villages. While the details of the October 1965 coup are incidental here, the scope and ease of subsequent killings suggested previously unsuspected rural tensions and communist weakness. Even perceptive academic estimates of PKI power failed to account for the rapidity of disintegration in the early months of 1966. 1

Although the pogroms of 1966 were unparalleled in extent, the PKI had faced similar annihilation twice before, in 1927 and in 1948. Founded in 1920 as the first Asian communist party, the PKI began with a Comintern approved strategy of creating a "block within" the "bourgeois nationalist" party, the Sarekat Islam. <sup>2</sup> That alliance crumbled early and the radical fragment which became the independent PKI focused on peasant and labor organizing which culminated in the poorly coordinated and consequently abortive uprisings of 1926 and 1927. The ripple of violence was enough to frighten the Dutch colonialists into severe and successful repression - those tied to the outbreaks either fled into exile or languished in the concentration camp of Boven Digul in Dutch New Guinea. Tightened restrictions confined remaining nationalists to a club type organizing and divorced the new leaders like Hatta, Sukarno, and Sjahrir from their mass base.

PKI mystique implies activism of an underground party during the depression and Japanese occupation, but if there was one it was inconsequential. The party surfaced again in the confusing aftermath to the Second World War and the declaration of independence. Tan Malaka, one of the exiles from the fiasco of the twenties, returned to test his charisma against Sukarno's in a tour of the Javanese countryside - it proved lacking and his heretical splinter of the party disappeared. The party took clearest shape under the more orthodox guidance of the Moscow trained Musso, also an old leader of the twenties. Fresh disaster struck the party through the Madiun affair of 1948. East Javanese military groups sympathetic to the PKI refused to disband out of fear that the less friendly Islamic and liberal nationalists would close in on the PKI. Here again it matters less who started the conflict than that the party leadership cast its lot with the recalcitrants and was wiped out in the process. Popular imagination branded the PKI a traitor to the cause and mass killings followed as they would again in 1966.

With a black mark on the record and the entire old guard of the party dead or discredited by Madiun, reorganization was cautious. The fragmented party emerged again as a whole under the Aidit leadership in 1951 and he was to remain in control of a remarkably unified and increasingly massive party until the coup of 1965. Success first became obvious with surprise polling among the top four parties in the national elections of 1955 and further gains in the regional elections of 1957. Support came primarily from the most thoroughly Javanese and least seriously Islamic portions of the Javanese population and led to some voice in local rule but little direct power over national policy. <sup>3</sup> The PKI sought not only to acquire voting

support, but also to cultivate alliance with President Sukarno and the Nationalist Party (PNI) he had founded.

At the same time, the parliamentary structure of this early period after independence had been shaky from its inception and declined in the face of internal conflicts which emerged to replace the uneasy truces of nationalism. Cabinets rose and fell with unsettling rapidity as public support for liberal rule had never been secure. 4 Hatta, Sjahrir, and the conservative Islamic Masjumi were the earliest powers; their image of "humdrum" bureaucratic organization and piecemeal progress failed to capture the imagination of a romantic pemuda (youth) whose emotions had been fired by a revolutionary struggle which seemed to promise more dramatic and immediate gratification. 5 Then the elections of 1955 served not so much to dampen factionalism as to extend it into the villages by magnifying traditional tensions and translating them into national politics.

Further crisis burst with the outbreak of regional rebellion in Sumatra and the Celebes and the resurgence in West Java and the North Celebes of the Darul Islam guerrillas. 6 The PRRI-Permesta rebellion was short lived despite support from the CIA, some regional army leaders, and an assortment of national political leaders. Support had been wavering from all quarters but final collapse owed a great deal to the failure of the rebels to enlist the formal support of Hatta and Masjumi. The Darul Islam movement scarcely passed the bandit stage, but like the regional revolt served a dual function. On the one hand, the regional and religious interests were discredited and temporarily eliminated; on the other, the act of elimination gave a healthy boost to army involvement in civilian administration and politics. 7 In the emerging order of Guided Democracy those powers were replaced by a new balancing act including Sukarno, the military, and the PKI.

Radical nationalism and domestic confusion became characteristic as Sukarno attempted to counteract increasing army power through reliance on the PKI mass organization. The rationalistic ideology of development gave way to a fervent nationalism served in a feast of symbols drawn from the Javanese tradition. Parliament became increasingly peripheral. Ushering in the new images of political form, Sukarno sought return to the more flexible constitution of 1945 and cried for reinstatement of the Pantjasila (Five Principles). It was to have been a politics of consensus and cooperation based on a romantic conception of rural Javanese practice. Sukarno saw his own function as reconciliation of divergent opinions

through a process of musjawarah-mufakat, the method of village lurahs (chiefs) through which all opinions are aired until the leader can articulate a genuinely communal decision reflecting an implicit common conclusion. The new cabinet was to have been a gotong-rojong (cooperative) body in which all major factions would find representation—in contrast to the squabbles and mud-slinging of party competition which had been a slap in the face of Javanese sensibilities.

External relations became a series of confrontations. First a vigorous anti-Dutch campaign to nationalize remaining Dutch business and gain control over west New Guinea. With those aims achieved in 1958 and 1962, attention turned toward the newly created federation of Malaysia, an object of confrontation lasting through the end of Guided Democracy.

In this ongoing crisis which has been independent Indonesia, the dilemma has been that of trying to transform a conglomerate of traditional cultures so that they can survive in the modern world while at the same time retaining a sense of indigenous identity. Crisis stems from imbalanced penetration of modern forms which has amplified already profound diversity. 8 It reflects the absence of a single network of nationally rather than regionally integrating institutions and reminds us that the national motto of “Unity in Diversity” has remained an expression of sentiment rather than social reality. 9 The real unity underlying Indonesian experience is the common agony of a world out of balance: in the arts it has been the “Great Debate”, to intellectuals the protracted identity crisis of those stranded between ethnic roots and Western ideals, and to peasants the confusion of a world their traditional cosmology cannot explain. 10 Grasping this thread of unity requires a plunge beneath the surface of different forms to the social forces which have pushed them to the surface of national politics and economic crisis.

This is not to question the intentions of individuals at the surface of political life, it is simply to subject them to more than descriptive analysis and to argue that intentions mean little apart from the conditions that have generated them and the situations to which they apply. It is like the study of linguistic structures - they are unquestionably real no matter how far removed from the consciousness of common speech. The method lies in the tradition of Marx and Lévi-Strauss as it is to probe beneath phenomena to levels of unconscious relationship. 11 Jacques Ellul makes the point in his book on *The Technological Society* by stressing that systems involve a convergence of specific views such that none can individually explain the process. In

fact, he argues that individual scientists and technocrats contribute to systems with overall directions frequently opposed to their individual convictions or awareness. So with all systems it happens that understanding of particulars is dependent on clarification of their relation to the whole.

At the surface of Indonesian politics, political alignments and elite tensions crystallized in the early phase of Parliamentary Democracy. While real power rested in the hands of party oligarchies rather than with either the parties or the populace, the election competitions of 1955 and 1957 served all too well by exacerbating latent conflicts and taking them all the way down to the village level. 13 The multitude of tiny parties which had appeared with the introduction of liberal government gave way after the elections to four major parties-Masjumi, the Nahdatul Ulama, the Nationalist Party, and the PKI. 14 Masjumi was rooted in modernistic Islam and urban based trading interests - geographically to the coastal cities of Java, to West Java, and to the Outer Islands generally. The Nahdatul Ulama (NU) was based on rural East and Central Javanese syncretic Islam through the *kijaji* and *pesantren* (religious teachers and schools). The Nationalist Party (PNI) drew most heavily on the Java centered bureaucracy, the partially transformed remnants of a *prijaji* (old aristocracy) who had become bureaucrats under the Dutch. The PKI created its base from among the poorer and more traditional sectors of the Javanese peasantry, the *abangan*, and from estate and mine workers throughout the archipelago. 15

The basic tensions coming out through the elections and clear in the constitution of the national elite focused on the split between Javanese and Outer Island interests - three parties were fundamentally Javanese and only the Masjumi represented the very different world of the Outer Islands. 16 Feith has suggested that this basic tension has been evident in the make-up of the elite since there has been an "Islamic entrepreneurial" group of more rationally oriented bureaucratic planners and a "Javanese aristocratic" group of less pragmatic and more traditional solidarity makers. 17 As description, Feith's distinction is valuable, but as analysis it takes on far greater significance when tied to Schmitt's contention that the differing policy interests of the two groups have been rooted in fairly immediate economic concerns. Then the surface politics of parties and elites only makes sense when it is related to the vastly different social worlds and historical experiences of the Outer Islands on the one hand and Java on the other.



The contrast is rooted profoundly in the basic ecological facts of the island world. Through soil and climate Java and neighboring Bali happen to have been suited for intensive wet- rice cultivation capable of supporting dense populations while in the Outer Islands the pattern has been one of shifting cultivation with pockets of intensive agriculture. As a result, the Javanese and Balinese created heavily elaborated kingdoms with sophisticated court traditions while the Outer Islanders turned toward inter-island and international trade which focused on petty riverine states. Successive waves of Indian, Islamic, and now Western influence have merely amplified the initial contrast between patterns: Java has faced consistently inward and the islanders outward. The early Hindu-Buddhist influences spread through the whole area but took deepest roots in the probably already complex inland kingdoms - it was their formative era. Conversely, the later Islamic incursion spread through the same area but had much more profound impact on the Outer Islanders.

Subsequent colonialism served again to intensify the split: in Java it led to a dangerously static "involution" of existing agricultural patterns and in the Outer Islands to tentative experiment with new forms of agriculture and mining. The era is perhaps best summarized with Geertz's much noted conclusion that it was "one long attempt to bring Indonesia's crops into the modern world, but not her people." 19 His point is that the effect of Dutch policy, consistent despite some wavering, was to prevent qualitative structural changes in the Javanese ecosystem since a change might have threatened the carefully arranged "symbiosis" of rice and sugar. The consequence for peasant agriculture was fantastic elaboration of the existing system-first expansion into available lands and finally more and more intense cultivation of rice and marginal crops. The economic situation remained precarious enough to discourage innovation since the subsistence orientation increased reluctance to gamble. 20

Outside the area of ethnic Javanese concentration, the role of Indonesians in the modern economy was considerably more active. These less intensely elaborated systems provided a setting for more innovative response so that coffee, tea, and tobacco were grown largely by indigenous small-holders in the Outer Islands and West Java while plantations among the Javanese were almost exclusively in Dutch hands. 21 Thus a further contrast in which the Javanese continued to turn inward while some of the Outer Islanders began to link themselves with the international economy. Geertz concludes that

As the bulk of the Javanese peasants moved toward agricultural involution, shared poverty, social elasticity, and cultural vagueness, a small minority of the Outer Island peasants moved toward agricultural specialization, frank individualism, social conflict, and cultural rationalization ... at least it did not foredoom the future. 32

By mid-century and with independence the involutions of the Javanese economy were straining to an extreme: Java's tenth of Indonesia's land area was supporting two thirds of her population of almost one hundred million.

Independence, rather than heralding solution to crisis, merely marked more rapid deterioration. The main problem was that political sovereignty did not imply economic independence. This central contradiction emerged from the Round Table agreements since that transfer of power had involved a guarantee of alien property rights, a guarantee which in Schmitt's words ensured that the "Indonesian political leadership was virtually restricted to performing administrative and police functions." 23 With the economy remaining essentially alien, the political incentives to development were undercut. As Schmitt argues

To champion accumulation without structural change meant to foster an expansion of the power of aliens, a consequence diametrically opposed to the dynamic of the independence movement. 24

At the same time, there was an internal conflict of interest between inland traders and agriculturalists who lost out through inflationary governmental policy and importers and bureaucrats who could gain through the black market. Even beyond this, it was both difficult and politically dangerous to tax importers due to their importance to the "foreign managerial groups that controlled the bulk of the economy." 25 Under these circumstances of early independence, in which the Dutch retained about two billion dollars worth of investments in Indonesia, the most the new government could do was encourage the growth of small-scale indigenous manufacturing. Yet, that manufacturing was strictly marginal to the central economic facts of Western control in the mining and estate sectors responsible for external trade. 26 The possible industrialization of Java was cross-cut by continued Western extraction of the abundant raw materials from the outer Islands. 27 With trade, banking, distribution, and transportation still in foreign hands, indigenous

entrepreneurship remained confined to local trade, handicrafts, and small manufacturing. 28

In the face of all this, it should be clear that there was a logic to the situation if not also to individual intention. As events unfolded, those with vested interests did their best to retain them. The economic nightmare of Indonesia has not been a quirk or unfortunate accident of late development - it has been a logical part of a world-wide economy in which those who start behind stay there. This is to argue with Schmitt and Levine that there is an active interweaving of economics and politics and that liberal economists like Higgins and Paauw miss the point when they argue that political instability and absence of technical and managerial skills underlie economic stagnation. 29 It is rather the converse: economic subservience breeding stagnation and political instability. Not that skills are not essential to growth, but that they will emerge only when the situation allows room for application of those skills. I am arguing as Geertz does in his comments on agricultural developments

... against a myopic pragmatic optimism which allows short-run gains to obscure the general trend of events, which isolates purely technical improvements from the historically created cultural, social, and psychological context in which they are set, and which, because of these failings exacerbates the ailments it sets out to cure. 30

Thus the much noted "dualism" of the Indonesian economy in which the modern sector of growing Western capitalism tied in with an internal sector of export-import traders politically, socially, and economically identified with Masjumi and the Outer Islands. Internally and politically, the conflict appeared to be between the pragmatically oriented "Islamic entrepreneurial" interests and the more symbolically geared "Javanese aristocratic" group.

Precisely these interests surfaced in the regional rebellions of 1958 in Sumatra and the Celebes. General sympathy and American assistance to the rebels reflected more than ideological empathy. 31 The West shared with the rebels a growing concern at radical nationalism which had led to the expulsion of Dutch capital and the drive to "regain" Western New Guinea. The revolt crystallized competing interests of producers and consumers; of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats; of the center and the regions. Final action followed Outer Island concern with the heavy concentration of foreign exchange earnings on Java rather than in the Outer Islands from which they

had come. 32 The conflict brought to a head the differences of ethos and economic interest separating the two economies and was something of a tactical error - its termination eliminated both Masjumi and the Outer Island interests generally from the already emerging system of Guided Democracy. As already mentioned, liberal rule had never had deep roots. Even among the Outer Island groups who were the earliest powers, it was understandably feared that majority rule would lead to Javanese power. Yet the Javanese had no more lust than the Outer Islanders for liberal government. All were ready for the passing of the liberal phase, but not all approved of the emerging triangle of Sukarno, the army, and the PKI.

In this triangle, Sukarno and the army were fairly equal and competing partners while the PKI survived as the only real mass organization Sukarno could use to counter army power. 33 Emerging from the revolution, the military leaders never stopped viewing themselves as the defenders of a nation which had been falling apart and needed good firm fatherly help - they were never politically passive. 34 At the same time, they were limited by a lack of formal legitimacy and an unpopular image resulting from widespread corruption and abuse of power. 35 As elsewhere in the developing world, the military was nonetheless a major power due to its monopoly of sheer force and efficiency of organization and communication.

During the liberal phase the military remained in the background and was characterized by regional and personal loyalties due to division into seven semi-autonomous regions. 36 Then a confluence of events resulted in centralization and extension of army influence into civilian rule. First the military moved in to supervise after workers had seized Dutch owned plantations in 1958 - this combined with the military role in ousting squatters to give them a substantial role in civilian management along with significant wasted interest. Then the military was centralized and strengthened through its role in crushing the revolts in the Outer Islands. The rebellion had led to military build-up and the central command had been directly responsible for the reassertion of national authority after the hostilities. 37 At the same time, the military took the initiative in wiping out the Darul Islam in West Java and the Celebes - the squashing of those religions extremists resulted in further army voice in local government. 38 Finally, Soviet arms and continued build-up came with the re-invigorated campaign to take over Western New Guinea. All of this resulted in greater centralization and increased army voice in civilian management and local government. All of this also led the military leaders to take a more and more active position on national planning which they felt had been

bumbled through party bickering, a bickering destructive of the army's prime goal of national unity. 39 As a result Nasution and other army leaders began to extend their role through rural civic action programs designed to reach the peasant masses directly. 40

Although the army did not begin as an ideological force, its leaders had no taste for the PKI. Relations never recovered from Madiun when important army groups had become convinced that the PKI had betrayed the national cause. Then later the army had gained a profitable stake in rampant bureaucratic corruption which was a main object of PKI agitation. In general, the army stood for the status quo not only because of its own vested interests, but also because it had to maintain order in situations where PKI agitation resulted in confrontation. The train of events left the army weakest in the areas of greatest PKI strength as

The impact of the army has been least in East and Central Java, where civilian administrative authority is strongly established and where there has been virtually no rebel or bandit activity. 42

So in the emerging order the main tension was between the army and the PKI.

The PKI found its strength through the development of mass organizations based on appeals to a peasantry whose aims had not been achieved with the conclusion of the nationalist revolution. That revolution had been an end in itself only for the Indonesian "semi-Westernized intelligentsia" who had replaced the outgoing colonialists. 43 As the Indonesian group empathizing most deeply with Western values, they were naturally the least likely to opt for profound change. Facing this elite was the problem of forging institutions capable of performing Geertz's "integrative revolution" - of creating a single nation by integrating the peasant masses and diverse ethnic groups into a single structure. 44 Kahin has described the situation immediately following independence

Despite its awakened national consciousness and the much increased vigor of political life at the village level, peasant society was still not effectively linked with the national government in a mutually activated and mutually responsive relationship. The existing relationship was still a predominately one-sided affair - from the top down ... parties floated as vague shapes above the peasant masses ... If the scope of the program which the Republic's leaders

undertook to carry out were too limited, or the pace too slow, they might forfeit their popular backing; and those more disposed to employ more authoritarian techniques might displace them at the helm of government. 45

Thus the challenge to the PKI, as to the rest of the elite, was to create organizations linking the structural levels of Indonesian society and in the process transforming the very nature of the peasantry. For the essence of that social grouping is pre-modern - peasants by definition being geared mainly toward subsistence and only marginally to meet the demands of some "Great Tradition". 46 At the same time, the conditions to which peasant social structures are appropriate have passed. Overpopulation, starvation, inaction, and poverty have not been mere creatures of the imagination and continuous deterioration has borne ample witness to the contention that traditional responses to ageless social needs are no longer adequate. For the peasantry at least, the revolution clearly remained in the future.

Hobsbawm has argued convincingly that peasant response to social deterioration is characteristically conservative in that it is aimed not so much at transforming social structure as at rectifying excesses within a system that is basically accepted. The task for modern movements is the translation of reactionary and millennial unrest into ideological terms which help peasants understand that their condition is a consequence of social structures they have the power to change. If the Chinese revolution and the continuing Vietnamese struggle prove nothing else, they clearly demonstrate that agrarian unrest can be politicized.

The Javanese peasantry are concentrated in East and Central Java and numbered around forty million by 1961. For virtually all of them the central ritual has been the selamatan, a feast held with neighbors to mark major events and rites of passage. For the most part, the beliefs tied to rituals are rooted in the oldest layer of Javanese spirit worship rather than in the later accretions of Hindu and Islamic belief. Still, perhaps a third of the population, mainly merchants and petty traders, belong to the santri segment of the population which takes its Muslim identification seriously. By independence practically all villages were at least loosely tied into the expanding money economy through trading connections centering on regularly interspersed towns. Urban culture flowing through those towns and down to the smaller villages has been important for centuries. Within village society there has been only minimal social stratification and a strong feeling of egalitarianism - balanced by extreme forms of deference to those with authority from outside the village. The basic social

structure has always been simple and vague with more importance in social interactions vested in geographical proximity than in kinship. 48

All of this has been changing. Villages have been strained by extreme shortages of land resulting from the growing population. In most areas the shortage has led to a parceling of land into smaller and smaller lots, but the portion of landless had grown to about 50% by 1964. 49 Hildred Geertz has suggested that

The Javanese peasants are what might be called "post traditional", for the combined impact of Islam and the colonial commercial development broke the tight integration of its traditional social structure but did not produce a modern institutional system ... 50

In the recent period a pattern of aliran politics has emerged and there has been a shift from geographical proximity to ideological belief as a basis of social relations - even core rituals of communal solidarity such as the selamatan have been politicized until they create more tension than they dissolve. 51 As Geertz describes it

An aliran is more than a mere political party, certainly more than a mere ideology it is a comprehensive pattern of social integration. The intensity with which the Javanese peasantry has fastened on to political and quasi-political organizations in the last decade ... is primarily an index of the degree to which new social structures are needed in the reconstruction of vigorous village life. 52

By far the most critical social contrast related to this growth of new forms is the dichotomy between abangan and santri, between those still rooted in predominately Javanese and those moving into more strictly Islamic lifestyles. 53

The Islamic "stream" of social and political life was tied in with trade and the money economy, that is capitalism. Islamic modernism centered in urban and trading society and involved a Weberian work ethic highly conducive to commercial success. 54 From the beginning Islam had been tied to the cosmopolitan trade world which had brought it to the islands - it was a progressive and dynamic influence and it liberated islanders from parochial ethnic cosmologies and introduced them to a world-wide community of Islam. 55 So on Java Islam penetrated through the trading cities of the north coast and on into the interior. Early conversion had been nominal,

but even in the earliest phases Islam had made gains as a potential banner for rebels challenging the kraton states. Later, returnees from the hadj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, began bringing back a more purified version of Islam tracing its roots to the Wahabite purist movement in Arabia at the close of the eighteenth century. This led to a series of conflicts between syncretic and purified versions of Islam which had begun several centuries earlier and carried on into the increasingly intense conflicts between santri and abangan in this century. 56

The expansion of Dutch control and converse emergence of the nationalist movement also gave a boost to Islam. Colonial policy had; consistently supported adat, that is customary law, in opposition to Islamic innovations. Initially justification lay in commitments to the status quo since the Dutch had chosen to work through existing rulers rather than to administer directly. But at the same time the policy set administrators against the indigenous commercial interest underlying Islam - perhaps not a co-incidence. Then with nationalism I would argue that Islam became, in effect, a tool through which commercial interests could create mass support. Again, this is not to suggest cynical manipulation and I would not argue that the leaders of Sarekat Islam saw themselves this way, but that is beside the point. There was a real community of interest between the urban and modern leaders of this mass movement and the rural masses they spoke to, but that was limited to common hostility against the Dutch and the Chinese and did not extend into common vision of a projected free society. In line with the progressive flavor of modernism generally, the leadership was particularly interested in expanding indigenous industry and business which was limited by both the Dutch and Chinese. 57 For the peasants, the question was one of changing the basic conditions of their life and not simply those who imposed those conditions on them. 58 The point is that it has been the commercial rooting of Islamic modernism rather than Islamic doctrine per se which has been hostile to the growth of communism in rural Java. 59 From the beginning there was a symbiosis of Islam and trade, but the antagonism Muslim have felt for communists becomes more understandable when this commercial rooting is kept in mind.

At any rate, there was a budding network of organizations filtering down to the village level before the PKI began work. While in Vietnam and China the communist movements managed to monopolize nationalist sentiment, the PKI had to overcome the taint of betrayal arising from Madiun and was faced with a viable network of competing organizations. Beyond this, the main social division was religious schism



rather than class conflict. In Jay's terms, the PKI fitted neatly into a slot in the schism complementary to that of santri Islam. From a more positive vantage point, the setting did offer a natural even if limited role for the PKI. Serious Muslims in rural Java mainly supported Nahdatul Ulama; the village elites of teachers and bureaucrats supported the PKI; and, as Hindley puts it, this left

the PKI and its mass organizations ... a virtual monopoly in channeling whatever social protest or aspirations there have been among the poorer abangan population. 61

This circumstance was no mean gift and the PKI either used it to good advantage or fell into the trap—depending on the perspective taken. Concurrently, the decline in communal land ownership, the growth of a landless peasantry, the increase in economic differentiation, and the ravages of ten years of war combined to “sharpen class conflict” and lend support to the PKI. 62 Hindley argues that there was a very close relationship between the limit and nature of this support and the policy the PKI could pursue

The nature of the social and economic conditions in Java has been the decisive factor in the determination of the precise form of the national united front policy formulated by the Aidit leadership. It is the decisive factor in understanding the Aidit leadership has been able to build a mass support. And it is a major factor in explaining why communist mass support is still an inadequate weapon for the seizure of power. 63

These circumstances of independent Indonesia go a long way toward explaining the role of the PKI under Guided Democracy.

To begin with then, I have explained the main directions of argument and have tried to establish the basic limits of the PKI's situation. In doing so I have sketched in the main phases of PKI and modern Indonesian history. Then I have explored the major social forces by looking at the regional tension between Java and the Outer Islands; at the implications of imperialistic economics; and finally, at the underpinnings of military and Muslim antagonism to and limits on the PKI.

## THE NAIL OF GOD

From this sketch of social forces and historical setting I turn to a discussion of the classical Javanese tradition and the impact of its conceptions of kingship and the millennium on modern politics. Those conceptions underlie the ideological and political limits Sukarno's Guided Democracy of 1960 through 1965 imposed on the PKI. Neither the structure of that system nor its strictures on the PKI become clear apart from this heritage.

Complex civilization traces its roots back over a millennium in the fertile plains of inland Java. Rich volcanic soil led to a dense population of wet-rice cultivating peasants and then to the emergence of elaborate court culture drawing inspiration from Indian contacts. Court culture focused at kratons which in concrete terms combined royal residence with administration and in more symbolic terms functioned as center of the universe. Peasants remained for the most part in self-sufficient villages, but sent occasional tribute of rice and labor for royal monuments and wars. Massive temple complexes such as those at Borobudur and Prambanan bear witness to flourishing Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms by the ninth century. Then this classical era culminated in the emergence of Madjapahit in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries as a power over inland Java and inter-island trade alike. With the growth of the cosmopolitan trading society in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the trading states of Java's north coast, the Pasisir, began to erode inland power and shift the focus of complex culture away from the interior.

These Pasisir principalities turned to Islam in their struggle against Madjapahit and in the process became centers for the nominal conversion of the entire island. Islam offered conceptual justification to local traders and state regents anxious to break away from the constraints of custom and central control. Coastal culture peaked in the sixteenth century, but at virtually the same time Dutch encroachment began threatening Pasisir control over trade and inland power reemerged with the formation of a nominally Muslim Mataram. Although professing Islam, the new state was a natural enemy of the Pasisir and quickly began to revive Indic tradition and rely on remnants of the old Madjapahit aristocracy.

Court scholars of early Mataram used the Babad Tanah Djawa not only as a chronicle, but also as an attempt to reconcile ancient Indian with newer Islamic

beliefs - a drive toward synthesis rooted in the Javanese tradition. Then in its turn the new empire gradually declined in the face of steady Dutch penetration so that the courts became enclaves of traditionalism and the aristocracy was transformed into a colonial bureaucracy. In the process the courts matched declining administrative power with rising cosmological and artistic preoccupations. Court culture became elaborate and rarified, etiquette and language formalized, and the arts fantastically refined. The strong aesthetic and cosmological link between the aristocracy and peasantry remained through the whole period as the *wajang*, the peculiarly Javanese shadow drama, served an educational as well as recreational role. Tradition persisted through the arts and enclave courts as well as through a bureaucracy which relied heavily on ancient custom when it surfaced in the nationalist movement of this century. 1

Classical Javanese cosmology and contemporary mysticism have been bound firmly to the basic affirmation that "all things are one" despite apparent separation. From this it is a small step to the fundamental conception that harmony and proper order come to human society when it is "tuned in" to the universal processes of nature. Proper balance and peace come through a parallel ordering of the micro-cosmos of human society and the macro-cosmos of natural order. 2 Soedjatmoko has briefly summarized some of the correlates of these basics

A central concept in the Javanese traditional view of life is the direct relationship between the state of a person's inner self and his capacity to control his environment. Inner perfection, reached through detachment and the control of one's emotions and reactions, radiates, through the inner stillness thus acquired, to the world and influences it. And as social hierarchy is seen as a reflection of the cosmic order, one's place in the hierarchy reflects the degree of inner perfection and power one has achieved. At the apex of this hierarchy stands the ruler, who rules by divine sanction and whose state of inner development is reflected in the condition of his realm. In this view territory is not the essential aspect of the state, but the court and the capitol are. More than anything else, they stand for the state itself. 3

At the center of the state the *kraton* for which it is named; at the center of the *kraton* the *prijaji* aristocracy; at the head of the *prijaji* the Godhead, the king. The king is the "nail from which the universe depends"; he is the mystic whose state of *semadi* or enlightenment allows him to synthesize everything to reconcile all oppositions and

make obvious to all that “all things are one” and that thus the whole cultural system is validated. He is the life force, he is Vishnu the creator, he is the lingam. He is the source of sexual vitality and communes nightly with mother earth through intercourse with wives who are the four winds - they are the directions of the compass symbolically brought together in harmonious balance under his roof. He is the only link between the natural and social orders and his power and legitimacy rest on that contact. 4

Ideally the power of the monarch rests not in control over people or resources, but through this contact with the divine. At the same time, the power he has is concrete and exists as a pure essence pervading the universe and remaining quite apart from conceptions of good and evil. Power simply is. Exercise of power is then a matter of accumulating and concentrating through attainment of a state of mind. Ben Anderson has suggested that

This conception of the entire cosmos being suffused by a formless, constantly creative power provides the essential link between the “animism” of the Javanese villages, and the high metaphysics of the urban Javanese syncretic theological tradition. 5

The ideal of the tradition is reflected in the pervasive tension within the traditional order between *alus* or refined behavior which is controlled and smooth and is the model for *prijaji* and *kasar* or coarse and rough behavior which is the common image of peasants. In the *wajang*, daemons are emphatically *kasar*, they constantly dissipate power and always lose to *alus* heroes who concentrate their power through mystical meditation. The epistemological foundation of mystical awareness lies in conviction that knowledge, which is the source of power, is a “stripping” away of veils” to reveal a transcendent which is obscured by ordinary consciousness. The image of “stripping veils” is from the Islamic tradition of Sufi mysticism, but applies just as well to the Javanese. Van der Kroef states that

The “good life” as Javanese gurus and mystics have viewed it through the ages, and as they have instructed king and peasant, is the progressive dissolution of the barriers to unity between man and cosmos ... the perfect unity of the divine order in which all “contradictions” are resolved ... A thorough understanding of the antithetical elements surrounding man is

regarded as the path to spiritual stasis, the selamet condition of mind called semadi among the Javanese. 6

And as Moertono puts it

True to all mysticism, these syncretic ideas seek to prove that all things are only aspects, saktis, emanations, and only integral parts of the all-embracing One ... 7

The drive behind this drive to reconcile oppositions is in belief that it is through mystical awareness that power flows from the natural sphere of order into the human sphere of society. Awareness translates into social order as

The perfect state and the perfect society ... is therefore not a goal to be achieved through hard work and rational planning, but in analogy with the progression from one mystical state to another - through the application of a key, a kuntji, the magically loaded formula. 8

The knowledge sought is not in "the slightest degree heuristic or pragmatic", but instead emphatically intuitive and supra-rational. 9 Mystically achieved awareness is considered a stock of techniques for maintaining cosmic equilibrium and its correlate of social order. 10

In all of this, man is seen very much as a cipher, as an agent of "immutable cosmic forces which essentially operate through him." 11 Even the divine ruler emerges as a tool of larger purpose - his role is not to exert individual will, but to function as a node through which the universal touches society. 12 For the Javanese mystic, learning and acting are a matter of discovering the self as a mere agent of the cosmos. The ego becomes nothing, but the self is then comprehended as a specific point of cosmic convergence.

Of course all of this is idealization and social reality merely orients itself toward and never embodies the ideal. Still, mysticism has always been profoundly alive for all strata of Javanese society so that the ideal of oneness with God has broad appeal even though "mysticism is considered wadi (dangerously secret) and is thought available only to the selected few." 13 In traditional villages the correspondence of macro-cosmos and micro-cosmos paralleled that of the state and each community

would have its own shrine marking the point of interaction. The whole economic and ritual process rested on communal religious obligations. The core ritual, the selamatan, has been a celebration of neighborhood solidarity and spirit worship. According to Geertz

The whole momentum of the Javanese ritual system is supposed to carry one through grief without severe emotional disturbance. 15

This emphasis on control over emotions is part of the overall connection between elite alus values and peasant society. The main vehicle for the transmission of prijaji values has been the wajang and the arts generally. 16

The central themes of traditional wajang were the alus-kasar tension and the striving for rasa, inner control and peace, through the “appropriateness of thoughts as established by duties to caste and hierarchy.” 17 Anderson has gone on to probe the relationship between these themes of the wajang and the “tolerance” of the Javanese. The basic sources for wajang tales have been the classic Indian; epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana, but there has always been considerable addition and elaboration of local tales along with reference to current events. The dalang, a man with a good deal of prestige, served not only as puppeteer and story-teller, but also as a source of esoteric mysticism and philosophy. While the wajang eventually absorbed some Islamic ideas, it remained a fundamentally Javanese and Indian venture.

The tolerance projected by the drama comes through in the plurality of acceptable models for behavior, a plurality contrary to Western and modern dichotomies of good and evil. Sanction came through the theater to all types of people at various positions of life and not just to a single ideal type. Along with this came the Javanese notions of existing states of life as an interplay of levels of reality. In the drama itself there is an interplay of levels: the Indian epics, local mythology, the dalang's interpolations, the leather puppets themselves, and the shadows cast on the screen. While each level had a concrete existence of its own and was independently evident to the audience, no one level was a final statement on what is “really real”. Neither the format nor underlying philosophy suggested an absolute. As a result, the Javanese demonstrate considerable tolerance of ambiguity. As Anderson puts it

The real and the really real are closely connected, but never identical, and therefore it never does to be too closely committed to either. 18

The same sense pervades social relations generally. Interactions are a constant interweaving of stylized forms, proper etiquette, formal speech, hierarchy, control, and underlying motion. Living and art merged for the *prijaji*. 19 Then there are two speech levels in the Javanese language-associated with *alus* and the *prijaji* on the one hand and with *kasar* and the natural man on the other. The formal language stressed the *prijaji* ideals of smoothness and emotional control, adherence to proper form and etiquette. In contrast, the lower language more clearly reflected immediate emotional responses. Again an interplay of levels of reality in which all levels are real in some sense, but none are ultimate or absolute. In each case there is what I would call a metaphorical sense of reality - the ultimate reality of forms resting not in themselves, but rather in their relation to the field of forms they interact with and beyond that to the mystical One. This is a dialectical frame of mind which became extraordinarily refined in the enclave *kratons* and which had an impact on the general population through the arts.

The fundamental drives toward cosmic harmony and balance and social unity tie in closely with the Javanese concepts of power, history, and the millennium. Proper social balance comes with periods of concentrated power at the center and history is seen as a cyclical ebb and flow of power, an oscillating concentration and dissipation. The ebb and flow is associated with the rise and fall of empires and monarchs as well as with the more cosmic Indian doctrine of the four *yugas*, the four historical epochs which are cyclically repeated and which culminate in the epoch of total destruction, the *kaliyuga*. 21 Periods of imbalance and chaos constantly give rise to the millennial expectation that it is the *kaliyuga*, that the existing order is on the verge of total destruction and the regeneration of a perfect order is imminent. The millennium is to follow the arrival of a *Ratu Adil*, a perfect prince or messiah whose spiritual empathy with the cosmos establishes a utopian balance of microcosm and macrocosm. 22 From time to time in Javanese history, peasant revolts and general mobilization have crystallized around this expectation.

The Java War of 1825 through 1830 was a last stand of traditional Mataram against the Dutch. In the struggle broad popular support came from Prince Diponegoro's appeal as a messianic figure. More commonly, peasant resistance to state intrusions focuses on religious leaders who appeal to messianic beliefs, beliefs which refer to

cosmic principles more than specific personalities. 23 In this century, millenarian concepts played a crucial role in the nationalist movement through organizations such as the Sarekat Islam and PKI and individuals such as Tjokroaminoto and his protégé Sukarno. These Javanese conceptions of power and the millennium help explain the force and grip of appeals to the masses through symbols rather than concrete organizing.

In mentioning this emphasis on symbols, Feith has noted the “intensely intellectual character of Indonesian nationalism” and Geertz that Sukarno's considerable skills “were all rhetorical”. 24 Rather than limiting him to a small circle of the intelligentsia, this helps account for his mass following. Symbols have been crucial to Javanese politics since popular concern rests more with the ruler's capacity to reconcile prevailing contradictions than with his control over ameliorative mass organizations. Confidence in the ruler then becomes a guarantee of meaning to the whole cultural world of the general population. Otherwise, there is a chaos of uncertainty and aimlessness in society at large. So Sukarno could proclaim that

I can grasp the entire gamut between Marxism and theism. I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies. I have blended, and blended, and blended them until finally they became the present Sukarno. 25

Among the Javanese, this capacity for synthesis at the ideological level is the key to social balance with the natural world. So the manipulation of symbols becomes a mystical juggling of keys to cosmic harmony - according to the images presented by Soedjatmoko and Anderson, power depends on the ruler's state of mind and flows outward from the center just as light from a lamp. Thus symbols retain an extraordinary grip on the political life of the people. This orientation toward ideological synthesis and unity as a response to social deterioration marks the major contrast between Javanese conceptions of power from ideas at the center and Marxist conceptions of power from organization at the base.

These traditionally rooted conceptions explain a great deal about politics under Guided Democracy. Soedjatmoko has pointed to a number of tendencies which surfaced under Sukarno: the tendency toward paternalistic authoritarianism, the inclination to seek employment in the civil service, the preoccupation with prestige and status rather than function and performance, the unquestioned obedience to authority, the concentration of politics in Djakarta, and the emphasis on



revolutionary fervor rather than problem solving. 26 Geertz has argued more strongly for a kraton perspective on the Sukarno regime

what he created, or tried to create, was a modern version of the theater state, a state from whose pageants, myths, celebrities, and monuments the small peasant or peddler, the enduring Marhaen, could derive a vision of his nation's greatness and strive to realize it ... after 1960 the doctrine that the welfare of a country proceeds from the excellence of its capitol, the excellence of its capitol from the brilliance of its elite, and the brilliance of its elite from the spirituality of its rulers reemerged with full force in Indonesia ... Sukarno, less plebian than he imagined and less radical than he sounded was the historical heir of the Indic tradition. 27

From beginning to end, Sukarno's career lends itself to this perspective. As a boy he immersed himself in the wajang and saw himself as a Bima, the ksatriya or warrior of the Pendawas

who strove incessantly to grasp the meaning of all existence ... relentless though he was in battling the disturbers of order from outside, he was nevertheless ready to work out a compromise with those in his ranks who were prepared to submit to that same order. 28

From early in the nationalist movement through the end of his political career with the fall of Guided Democracy, he saw himself as the mouthpiece of the people and main agent of synthesis. From the Mahabharata and through the wajang, he saw the struggle for independence and the completion of the revolution as that between the Pendawas who had rights to the land and the Kaurawas who had seized it. First it was the Indonesians against the Dutch; then the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) versus the on Established Forces (OLDEFOS). As he saw it, his task was to lead in the endless struggle for social justice by demonstrating that at heart all things are one - so that apparent differences between forces such as Islam and Marxism are seen as misconceptions resulting from departure from the spirit of their respective prophets. 29

During the struggle against the Dutch and in the first years of independence, Sukarno played a primarily symbolic-role as the "father of the nation". It was only with the decline of liberal government and transition to Guided Democracy of the

late fifties that he reemerged to play a central role. With the new order, there was a return to the more flexible constitution of 1945 and the main doctrines of Sukarno's thought. The core of the new ideology was the Pantjasila and around it an elaboration of images drawn from traditional Javanese village structure. The Pantjasila, or "Five Principles", include nationalism and elimination of imperialism, international humanitarianism and third world solidarity, a democracy of musjawarah-mufakat (deliberation and consensus), social justice (sama rasa sama rata), and belief in one God. The basic ordering principle was that of gotong-rojong - mutual aid and cooperation as it was practiced in the more traditional villages. In Sukarno's mind the idea of gotong-rojong extended to include the formation of a truly representative cabinet drawing on each of the major political currents of Nasakom (the acronym standing for nationalism-religion-communism). In these keys, Sukarno claimed to have summed up the Indonesian heritage and re-gearred it for a modern situation in which the state should take the lead by completing the revolution. 30 For Sukarno the major enemy was always Western liberalism, whether represented by imperialism or liberal rule at home.

The main features of the regime have been touched in the introduction - the plethora of slogans of national unity and the series of external confrontations against the Dutch and Malaysia. Most of the parties of the liberal phase faded into the background after the regional strife of the late fifties until the PKI, the military, and Sukarno remained. Pragmatic developmental planning gave way to slogans and symbols of unity; governmental expenditure concentrated more and more on the recreation of Djakarta as a city of monuments, modern buildings, and the Asian Games (a third world counter to the Olympics). Military authoritarianism extended into the village sphere and the political and ideological activities of all remaining parties was curtailed.

In the villages which had served as a model for ideology, the slogans actually found some roots. Gotong-rojong activities remained strongest in areas farthest from modern penetration but spread somewhat with governmental campaigns to extend village cooperatives and communal projects. 31 To counter the earlier emergence of aliran politics and tensions, government agencies stressed communal identification and tried to encourage the growth of modern coops and schools based on traditional forms and resulting from stimulation of voluntary activities. 32 At least to some extent, slogans were interpreted in traditional fashion. In one village meeting of

Permai, an active mystical-political sect, Geertz reports that there was a mystical interpretation of the Pantjasila along with

a micro-macrocosm correspondence theory in which the individual is seen to be but a small replica of the state, and the state but an enlarged image of the individual. If the state is to be ordered, then the individual must also be ordered; each implies the other. 33

For the law officials, there was a Sanskrit based argument that those who enforce order must be examples of it and the relationship between government and national welfare was supposed to be symbiotic. According to propaganda, "government goes to the village and arises from the village" and government directed developments only by articulating latent thoughts of the masses. 34

Through it all there was a considerable excess of verbiage and absence of program - and for obvious reason. In the first place, Guided Democracy represented a return to the conviction that social order and progress are by-products of a state of mind. Perhaps more to the point, Lev has argued that

there developed the contradiction that while Indonesian ideology often appears to be radical, the social reality of Indonesia - the very elite which articulates the radical ideology - is decidedly conservative. 35

Anderson offers by far the most penetrating analysis of this split between the political elite and rural masses. In his view, the new national language was seen by the elite as an enterprise designed to master the existing crisis by providing the key to the appropriate frame of mind. As social classes congealed after independence, the new language bifurcated until there was a contrast between the languages of the elite and mass equivalent to that between *ngoko* and *krama*, the lower and higher levels of traditional Javanese. As the process developed, "the external language of revolutionary socialism has been taken over and given an esoteric sense, scarcely connected at all to its overt sense." 36 Thus the language which had spread with the nationalist movement as a symbol of inter-ethnic unity began to mark the separation of social classes. Themes originating as serious propositions turned into tokens - here a dialectic in which the meaning of language clearly depends on the context of usage rather than the words themselves. For the elite, this meant an obvious inclination to stress external conflicts rather than internal progress which would certainly have

upset the emerging class order. Under Guided Democracy, the crystallization of an elite was a re-establishment of traditional Javanese political and social conceptions.

The dialectical dimensions of Sukarno's thought should already be fairly obvious. I have taken Dahm's argument that the key idea for Sukarno was synthesis according to the Javanese tradition, that is to demonstrate the fundamental unity of all things. Then I have tried to show how the role of the state under Sukarno was to relate symbiotically to the masses by articulating their latent wishes and translating them into a model for action. Sukarno's image of himself as the mouthpiece of the people fits into this dialectical framework since it is an argument for the existence of unconscious desires which are in some sense more real than these on the surface. So also with his argument that conflict between Muslims and Marxists stemmed from misconceptions - that in each case the followers were clinging to the ashes rather than relighting the flames of their mentors' spirits. 37 In this as in everything, Sukarno struggled to transcend differences of expression and get through to roots he was positive were the same. His conclusion was that all could be blended and subsumed into one fundamentally Javanese vision.

His speeches were patterned on the wajang he had grown up with and he reached into the Indic tradition for an image of all things having meaning only in terms of their relation to the One. So he held that even the five elements of the Pantjasila were indivisible and intertwined. 38 So good and evil each had a place in a world where they defined each other. So every thesis has its antithesis; every repression its reaction. Thus the reconstruction of the nation could not happen without a simultaneous destruction and he could say that

A revolution ... is a great symphony, a great symphony of destructive and constructive forces ... a great symphony between the forces which destroy, crush and turn things to dust, and the creative, constructive forces; a simultaneous action of two mighty processes. 39

So also, he could not see himself apart from his roots in the masses he embodied - the relationship was symbiotic just as at all levels the parallel ordering of individual, state, and cosmos implies symbiosis. 40 At the same time, he saw that the interaction was never static

doctrines themselves did not change ... but the knowledge of men about them was subject to continual alteration. Therefore, new interpretations and corrections of the old perceptions must again and again be made ... Let us not look at the letter; let us look at the spirit, the soul of the letter. 41

From this drive to discover the essential spirit of different beliefs, he developed his own synthesis in Nasakom. In that blend he felt that Islam offered the dimension of profundity, Marxism that of time, and nationalism that of space. 42

While he could tolerate all manner of compromise in the interest of internal unity, he was thoroughly opposed to liberal Western thought and saw no room for it in his synthesis. He always opposed the creation of divisive parties and abhorred individualism and the democracy of fifty-one percent rule. 43 The Javanese had absorbed the whole sequence of Indian and Islamic ideas, but with the arrival of the liberal and modern West, there was no longer a chance for synthesis - it became an either-or situation. Distaste for liberal theory was a natural consequence of both colonial rule and the deep-seated Javanese beliefs. The Javanese focus on unity and harmony of men with each other and the cosmos ran directly counter to liberal theory which suggests that men are isolated and competing individuals. At the most basic philosophical level, the Javanese sense of unity of all being clashed with Kant's idea of "things in themselves". Where Kant and Hegel diverged in the Western philosophical tradition, the Javanese could relate more to Hegel.

For nationalists everywhere, Marxism had an immediate appeal as the most thorough and helpful critique of the imperialism they struggled against. It offered the most complete image of what was going on along with a fully articulated analysis of the major enemies of the colonized peoples. As Benda puts it, communism offers

a meaningful closed system in which each member is once again assigned his firm place and duties; unfree he will be, almost certainly more rigidly regimented than ever before, but at least he will be freed from the freedom to perish in neglected and harassed social isolation. 44

Because the Marxist critique was obviously apt and clear, "it was taken over wholeheartedly by all important segments of the elite." 45 Still, I think it is crucial to

stress that in Java there was an empathy far transcending the needs of the nationalist elite in its particular situation. Soedjatmoko has argued that

The jump from the a-historical Weltanschauung of traditional agrarian society, with its chiliastic yearnings for the perfect society, to the closed and self-contained system of thought and vision of the perfect state of Marxism is apparently a smaller one than the jump to the concept of an open future and the acceptance of the imperfect state as part of the human condition. 45

The jump in question is clearly incorporated into Marxism itself. In *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, Engels connects a romanticized notion of primitive society with his projected image of a socialist utopia - it is a kind of innocence common to both ends of the dialectic and absent from the middle. 47 Because of the situation, the influence of Marxism touched most of the Indonesian nationalist elite, but profoundly influenced few. There was enough empathy between traditional and Marxist at the theoretical level to account for considerable use of radical jargon, but where the two differed the elite generally retained a traditional orientation. For the Javanese portions of the elite, Marxism lent itself to synthesis with the existing blend of Indic and Islamic conceptions but liberalism did not. Marxism entered in as part of the stock of symbolic keys - this time it was seen by Sukarno as the key weapon in the struggle to defeat liberalism and capitalism, but it was not a totally exclusive intellectual framework for him.

Spearheading the effort, Sukarno has been variously cast as Vishnu, the Ratu Adil, as the father, as Krishna. For those who wanted to carry the analogy with tradition farther, Subandrio, Abdulgani, Mudadalam, and Aidit served as high priests. 48 All the rumors of Sukarno's sexual prowess may have seemed slanderous in the Western press, but to the Javanese this virility symbolized the vitality of the nation - Sukarno as lingam, as the father of the nation, as Vishnu the life-giving principle. In this there is a striking correspondence between Javanese mystical conceptions of kingship and the psychoanalytical dialectics of Norman O Brown.

For Brown the transition from primitive society to kingship is equivalent to the transition in human sexual life from an infantile stage of "polymorphous perversity", of general sexual pleasure, to that of genital sexuality. In the process there is a dialectic of repression and the return of the repressed. Once generalized pleasure is denied, the same energy is focused more intensely through orgasm, an orgasm which

is a release for the whole body and not simply for the genitals. For Brown, "A king is an erection of the body politic". 49 The king is

A part which is no longer a part; out of the body the soul. The soul arising out of the body and set over the body; the state arising out of society and then set over society ... The body, like the body politic, is a theater; everything is symbolic, everything including the sexual act ... The function of the representative organ is to impersonate, incarnate, incorporate in his own body the body politic. 50

The king emerges as a collective ego whose function is to validate the whole complex of ritual and symbol which gives focus to life. Through the submission of the whole to the part, there is a return for all in a richer nexus of symbolic expression. In Brown's tension between the life and death principles, the king epitomizes the life force - for the Javanese he is Vishnu. At any rate, the analysis ties in well with Sukarno's image of himself as representative, as link between man and cosmos; it suggests another strong congruence of Javanese mystical and Western dialectical thought.

As I hope to demonstrate, the Marxist conception of the party resembles this notion of kingship and stems from the same basis in dialectical thought. At a more concrete level, these ideas help in understanding the limits imposed on the PKI - they explain the nature and limits of Sukarno's attraction to Marxism and establish as well what the general Javanese perspective on the PKI would be. For Sukarno, the PKI was more than a mere tool in his efforts to counter army power - it was also a major driving force behind his efforts to complete the Indonesian revolution by establishing general social justice. Even after his fall in 1966, he mentioned to Dahm that he still stood with Nasakom

Masjumi and PSI obstructed the completion of our revolution. The PKI, however, was the avant-garde of the revolutionary forces. We needed her for the implementation of social justice and a prosperous society.51

From his perspective both the army and Muslims were suspect and the PKI could be useful as demonstration of his popular support and in leading popular backing for his radical foreign policy. 52 In the process of accommodating Sukarno, the PKI lost autonomy - Hindley argued that

Identification with and praise of Sukarno might increase the PKI's mass support, but it might also reduce the PKI's control over their supporters. 53

and McVey that

The more the Party gained within the legal framework, the more dependent it became on the terms of that framework and the more in the way of establishing organization and influence it had to lose by resorting to violence at any given point. 54

While Sukarno protected the PKI from potential military harassment, the PKI was forced to swallow the ideology of Guided Democracy by forgoing emphasis on class struggle and instead working toward Nasakom and the Pantjasila. As its position was always precarious, there was little choice but to accept severe limits.



## THE MASS LINE

Ideas have no meaning apart from the conditions which have generated them and the context to which they are applied. This argument has been made with great clarity in Joseph Levenson's *Confucian China and its Modern Fate* - his point there is that the ostensible continuity to Confucian ideology conceals an underlying discontinuity through the fact that it performed very different functions during different periods of its florescence and decline. The argument has immediate implications to study of Marxism as it has spread from west to east, the more so since Marxism includes a dialectical component responding to precisely this point. For adherence to theoretical fundamentals clearly implies differences of application as theory and circumstance are woven into program in particular areas.

So far, I have tried to outline the circumstances of recent Indonesian history, society, and politics and have suggested that there is a shallow but strong congruence of Javanese mystical and Western Marxist thought. The common basis in dialectical images helps account for the definite place the PKI found in Indonesian politics but suggests at the same time the severity of the ideological strictures binding the Party. The turning point of contrast between systems is the Javanese image of power flowing outward from a center point of contact between the king and the divine. While this Javanese notion has led to heavy emphasis on symbols in politics, Marxist theory implies that power is a consequence of mass organization based on response to the concrete needs of the people. On the one hand the center; on the other the base. Here I will discuss the PKI's theory and practice of power by concentrating on the place of the peasantry in Party strategy. It has been in these appeals to the peasantry that Asian communists have departed farthest from their European mentors.

The Hegelian underpinnings of Marxist dialectics centered on the assertion that the human condition is basically unfree since the context of human existence is established by forces beyond the self, beyond the individual. 1 As Marcuse puts it

the world of objects, originally the product of man's labor and knowledge, becomes independent of man and comes to be governed by uncontrolled forces and laws in which man no longer recognizes his own self. 2

History is seen as a dual process of emerging repression and self-consciousness, of Mind. According to this image, freedom is not the permission to remain subject to forces beyond the self, but the negation of apparent reality and the return to innocent self-consciousness and true harmony with the external processes of the natural order. 3 Complete freedom then comes through the denial of man's alienation from himself.

In trying to bring Hegel down to earth, Marx focused on the labor process as the basic mechanism of alienation. To him, the essential contradiction of capitalistic society, and the ultimate source of its projected historical negation, lay in the oppression of the workers by management and machines. Oppression resulted from the fact that workers dedicate the whole of their being to a productive process which they neither controlled, owned, nor gained from. While workers earned only according to the needs of subsistence, capitalists gained from the exchange value of the products and thus expanded profits continuously. 4 As Marx saw it, the very thoroughness of capitalistic oppression would be the source of its demise. The proletariat became the first historical agent having nothing to lose and everything to gain through the transformation of the productive system by subordinating it to the needs of general rather than individual welfare - it seemed to him to be the first class which had no selfish interests and thus its development became a measure of progress toward socialism. 5 The peasantry played a marginal role and necessarily followed the lead of either the bourgeoisie or proletariat. 6 The marginal role of the peasants in Europe helps explain this conclusion, but at the same time his argument was that there was no natural cohesion among peasants, no cohesion such as the industrial process imposed on workers. Thus the peasantry would remain isolated and reactionary; the workers could become organized and revolutionary.

While Hegel and Marx provided an analysis, Lenin and Mao began its translation into practice. In primarily agrarian Russia, the revolution remained an urban phenomenon, but Lenin had a long standing concern with the development of a worker-peasant alliance. Then while Marx had felt that revolutions in backward nations would have to progress through a bourgeois phase, Lenin argued that they could progress directly to socialism. 8 Both Marx and Lenin believed that the peasantry would play a greater role in backward than in advanced nations, but neither thought that role would be active.

In China the focus on peasantry was some time in emerging, but the shift in focus was pronounced when it came. Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of Chinese

communism, began to turn toward the peasantry as early as the May 4th movement of 1919. 9 After observing spontaneous peasant revolts throughout China, he concluded that the peasants would have to play a major role in the revolution and that they should be coordinated by the intelligentsia under the slogan of "land to the peasants who till it". 10 Focus on the peasantry appealed to Li's predilection to enhance the traditional in China, an inclination not as easily compatible with concentration on the more internationally oriented workers.

Mao later built on this and went far beyond Lenin by suggesting that the party would emerge from the peasantry and through guerrilla warfare. 11 To Mao the peasantry constituted a rural proletariat - alienated from the products of its labor through the excessive demands of landlords and compradores. He felt he had had a taste of his projected communist society in his years in Yen-an during the 1930s. His strategy was the creation of the similar bases of the revolution in rural areas throughout China and the gradual isolation of the cities until they too had to join in the revolution. As a guideline for action, he stated

Twenty-four years of experience tell us that the right task, policy, and style of work invariably conform with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably strengthen our ties with the masses, and the wrong task, policy and style of work invariably disagree with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably alienate us from the masses. 12

From this perspective, Party power flows from its capacity to channel the perhaps unconscious drives of the masses. The key to power lay in organization which served as a catalyst for the articulate expression of latent grievances, organizations which would lead to a flow of power from the mass base into political action.

In Both China and Vietnam, well disciplined cellular organizations have been the basis of contact with the masses. In Vietnam the effectiveness of rural organizing explains the success of the communists and failure of moderate nationalists in the face of severe French repression. 13 The unglamorous business of cadre organizing in the villages has taken a similar form in various areas. The ideal formula has been to give ideological training to experienced activists who are themselves villagers. Then those cadres are sent to familiarize themselves with and assimilate to a village where they would teach basic literacy along with raising political consciousness and establishing networks of organizations offering concrete channels for actions leading

to socio-economic change. 14 The key to success then lies in the cadres' capacity to translate their general ideology into terms having meaning in the village context. Ultimately, the aim is to convince peasants that they have the power to transform their environment if they organize and present a united front to their oppressors. Ideology and organization then emerge as fundamental principles of power.

Others have concluded, and my own work confirms, that the Aidit PKI leaders were thoroughly familiar with this international communist tradition. The general level of ideological rigor far exceeded that of the 1920s and Tan Malaka. The leadership tightly controlled access to all communist literature, but strongly encouraged the reading of the "classics" and broadened awareness through extensive cadre training and the establishment of a People's University in 1958. 15 Mao and Lenin were the most frequently translated, but many others were accessible. 16 Aidit and Lukman, another major leader of the PKI, spent eighteen months in China and Vietnam just before rising to the head of the PKI, but as youthful representatives of a recently devastated party they received little attention. 17 At any rate, familiarity with those movements does less to explain subsequent similarities than parallels between them and the centrality of the peasant question in each case. Aidit continually stressed the need for creative rather than dogmatic application of Marxist-Leninist theory - although parallels with China and Mao are clear, the over-all PKI strategy of a united front from above was independent. 18 He affirmed that

in the struggle to create a united national front, both by cooperation with various political parties or by cooperation with peoples of various trends and ideologies, the Party must not become merged with them - the Party must preserve its political, ideological, and organizational independence. 19

At least on the surface, the Aidit PKI was neither a mindless mimic nor careless agent of Marxist theory - rather it seemed to be a creative, independent, and responsible Party. In the face of tight restrictions, the triumvirate of Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto transformed the PKI from a shattered remnant into the best disciplined and most powerful of Indonesia's parties.

The new leadership concluded very early that the only viable route to power lay in acquisition of massive popular support. At the same time, geo-political circumstances prevented consideration of an aggressive Yenan strategy. As Hindley summarizes it

Without the image of the PKI as patriotic, sympathetic to religion, opposed to the use of force in the achievement of its goals, attached to democracy, moderate in demands, friendly toward the non-communist political forces, and generally responsible in the exercise of the role of non-governing party, the Party could neither win the sympathy of the broad masses of poorer people, nor the toleration of ruling groups toward the PKI's organizing activities. 20

At first the situation was grim - power lay with the rightists in the years immediately following independence and there were no communists in positions of power. The old guard of the party had been eliminated at Madiun and the party had broken into three major fragments: a front organization at Jogja, the socialist and labor parties, and an underground which retained control over the front groups. 21 Then in 1950 the youthful triumvirate began to assume the leadership they were to keep firm grip on until the coup of 1965. They began by republishing the Party theoretical journal, Bintang Merah (Red Flag), and joined the Central Committee in 1950. 22 Through careful organization they prepared the Party for its election victories of 1955 and 1957. Those striking successes contributed to the decline of Parliamentary Democracy as Muslim and liberal groups began to fear that only the PKI would gain through voting. When the PKI survived precariously during the transition to Guided Democracy - in 1960 there was a brief ban on most of the Party publications and Sukarno had to step in several times to lift army restrictions on local PKI activities. 23

Basically, Aidit considered independent Indonesia both "semi- feudal" and "semi-colonial" due to remnants of traditional culture and the persistence of Dutch, English, and American involvement in sectors such as oil, tin, and rubber. In particular, he was hostile to the concluding agreement Hatta had made at the Round Table discussions finalizing the transfer of sovereignty - those agreements had ensured continued foreign investments and Dutch retention of Western New Guinea. Continuing colonialism was clear to him in protected foreign investments and "ownership" of about 20% of the productive land; feudalism in landlord "monopolies" and the subjugation of the peasantry to demands for land rent in kind, for corvee labor, and high interest rates. 24 His aim was to eliminate first imperialism and then feudalism. Strategically, his intention was to pursue a line of a "united front from above" by "building up the progressive forces, uniting the middle of the roaders, and isolating the diehards." 25 Settling on a long range policy from the

beginning, he felt at first that the workers would be the main driving force of the revolution. Then since there were only about half a million workers in industry and another two million in crafts and small industry, he naturally began to shift toward focus on the peasantry through a proposed worker-peasant alliance. By 1951 he saw the necessity of an alliance and by 1954 he had concluded that “the agrarian revolution is the essence of the people's democratic revolution in Indonesia.” 26

In viewing its own origins, the new PKI leadership looked back on three earlier phases of communist activity: the foundation and first “white terror” of the twenties, the underground and anti-Fascist struggle from 1926-1945, and the period of the second terror after the World War until 1951. The earliest failure was attributed to leftist deviation and lack of theory; the Madiun disaster to the absence of a peasant base and inexperience in the formation of a united front. 27 From these failures, the leadership concluded that success in leading the revolutionary alliance in Indonesia required rigorous interweaving of the universal truths of Marxist-Leninism with the concrete conditions of the situation and the building of a united front including the peasantry. 28 In the Aidit phase, ideological rigor and Party discipline became constant themes even if neither ideal became a political reality.

Aidit and his fellows were well aware of the dialectical facet of their theory and they constantly warned against dogmatism on the one hand and empiricism on the other. They stressed repeatedly that they were not imitating or following the orders of any foreign Party and that the conditions in Indonesia clearly made strategies such as Mao's unfeasible - there was neither the geographical nor social basis for guerrilla warfare and survival necessitated the tolerance of those in power. 29 Marxism was clearly understood as a dynamic ideology with a theoretical basis which remained consistent even while application depended on the context. So Aidit understood Leninism as “simply Marxism in the era of imperialism” and called for the creative “Indonesianizing” of Marxism. 30 The concern was never merely abstract - it was rooted in conviction that the PKI had to guide itself with truly scientific principles of dialectical materialism. Otherwise it would never assume its proper role in making the revolution in the name of the masses. Aidit argued that

We must adapt the entire party to the development of the situation so that the party is better able to direct the development of the situation. 31

The Party presented itself as a synthesis of Marxist theory and the Indonesian class struggle, as a Party with a program rather than merely a dogma. 32

As PKI leaders looked back over their indigenous roots, they were conscious of a number of strains conducive to their theory. They themselves saw more to empathize with in the oldest and most deeply underlying rather than more modern traditions. Aidit stressed the communal nature of primitive Indonesian society and Njoto credited that "layer" with a dialectical frame of mind. 33 At the same time, Njoto failed to see any dialectical facets to Hinduism and instead argued that indigenous dialectics had been repressed by the later Hindu and Islamic accretions. In terms of program, this revolutionary Party sought a return to traditional forms of art and culture - but purged of their feudal character and changed its progressive tools. The *wajang* and folklore were to serve as tools of revolution only because they touched the masses and not due to any recognized philosophical empathy. 34

The PKI, I think, pointed to congruence with the most deeply underlying Javanese and island traditions only out of desire to identify with the common people at a gut level. Thus the appeal was more to utopian and millennial strains than to historical phases of social organization. The traditions of Indic and Islamic history had their representatives in contemporary political interest groups; the masses of peasants did not. So in phrasing appeals to the masses, the point was to take themes most particularly relevant to them, it was to step into the nebulous and polymorphous millennial tradition. Of course at base that tradition is little more than a chaotic expression of fundamental and therefore rather simple utopian drives. The drives and energy are those common to all people; the form of expression simply a consequence of social conditions.

The intensity of appeal was explicitly limited by recognition that "rousing" actions were prohibited. The point was not simply to lead a burst of millennial fervor, but to organize and channel that energy through small but concrete actions in "everyday" work among the masses. 35 So the Party stressed research into the conditions of mass life, appeals to direct interests in winning votes, the value of education as a counter to bureaucratization, the achievement of specific Parliamentary gains, and the extension of mass based organizations of all sorts. 36

At the root of PKI analysis, there was a thoroughly Marxist argument that the development of the nation toward both economic well being and democracy

required basic structural changes at the highest level - rather than simply the development of skills or education. Aidit stressed the integral relationship of economics and politics

The objective conditions of any society are especially made clear through the productive relationships - relationships which may support and encourage or restrain the forces of productive development ... politics constitutes the central fact of an economy, or, put in another way, economics is the foundation and goal of politics. 37

Ultimately then, solution to Indonesia's economic crisis demanded transformation of the productive relationships - in the rural areas the abolition of "feudal" remnants and granting of "land to the peasants" and in the advanced sectors the expulsion of foreign interests. According to Aidit again

Indonesia's semi-colonial status results in perpetual economic crisis. The only way out is by liquidating the semi-colonial status and replacing it by a system of people's democracy. 38

For the PKI it seemed clear that the 1945 revolution had not brought full people's democracy and independence because it had not assured economic independence. That revolution had merely served the interests of the indigenous compradores, of the national bourgeoisie, and had not revolutionized the situations of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie. Those classes thus became the main driving forces of the united front to terminate colonial remnants and could ally with the bourgeoisie in the struggle against foreign imperialism, but not as firmly in the accomplishment of internal economic goals. 39 The PKI strongly opposed reliance on foreign aid and instead leaned toward strengthening of the governmental sectors of the economy, extension of rural cooperatives, and the carrying out of a thorough land reform program. 40

The PKI conviction that the revolution remained basically incomplete tied in well with Sukarno's argument - as did the related Party argument that in carrying through the revolution there had to be a dual process of construction and destruction. The PKI readily conformed to many of the requirements of Guided Democracy and lend its support to increasingly leftist foreign policy, but at the same time was subject to tight restrictions in ideology as well as activity. Understanding



Sukarno's role in protecting the Party and knowing his penchant for flattery, the PKI played up to both. The PKI gave full support, as perhaps it had to, to the ideological drive of Guided Democracy: for a gotong-rojong cabinet, Nasakom, the 1945 Constitution, konfrontasi (against Malaysia), the Pantjasila, and the economic progress. 41 Simultaneously, Aidit felt that the role of the Party was to continue the leftward movement of the revolution by constantly reminding Sukarno of the broader frame of analysis underlying PKI support of Guided Democracy. 42 Against allegations of foreign ties, the Party affirmed that it was only pursuing the best economic and social interests of the collectivity; in reference to Islam it was quick to point out its equally foreign origins. 43 The same argument held in PKI critique of liberal theory such as Sumitro's. 44 The Party accepted the real gains which had been made through nationalism, but went on to assert that where the bourgeoisie fell short in performing its historical tasks, the Party would press forward. 45 Thus the PKI accepted the existing ideologies as one step toward its own goals, as a concrete factor in the situation. Realistic enough.

At the same time, the PKI had to sacrifice emphasis on the class struggle in order to conform to the needs of a united front designed to draw on bourgeois support. As a result, it was more feasible to focus on external confrontations than internal conflict. Unity within took precedence. In an interview in 1964, Aidit refused even to discuss the ideological disagreements of PKI and Murba styles of Marxism - out of professed unwillingness to endanger unity needlessly. Similarly, he stressed that as a scientific socialist he understood the social functions of religion and had nothing against Islam per se - it was anathema only when used for reactionary purposes. He strongly affirmed the Pantjasila as a basis of order and cooperation among competing parties, parties which he felt should have been drawn together in a united front rather than abolished. 46 although perhaps inescapable, it was this emphasis on unity rather than conflict which lay at the heart of the breakdown of accommodation in the later years of Guided Democracy. In those later years, the actions of peasants at the base of Party organization and the strategy of the leaders at the top became irreconcilable. The leaders continued with a stress on accommodation and search for a place at the top; the masses became concerned with immediate achievement of concrete changes in land policy at the base. The extent of Aidit's stress on internal unity is evident through consistent concern with the legality of PKI activity and through the notable absence of tension between the rural masses and compradore classes in his 1963 listing of the major contradictions in the world. He did list the tension between socialism and imperialism, between classes in capitalistic nations, between

imperialists, and between the oppressed and imperialist nations and stated that the PKI was most concerned with the first and last of these. Omission of class struggle within third world nations is the more significant since he made his speech in Peking.

The PKI drive for peasant backing began in preparation for the national elections of 1955. In 1954 less than half of the membership of 165,206 were peasants; by 1962 about sixty percent of the membership of two million were peasants. 48 The difficulties of the enterprise were enormous. Although the rural economic situation was dismal and declining through the whole period, peasants tended to value cohesion along traditional lines and persisted in feeling that they had no power to change their situation. Even in joining the PKI, they might think that the symbolic act of joining was more crucial than subsequent efforts. In fact, a very large portion of the membership had little sense of the ideology they identified with. 49 One advantage for the PKI lay in general failure of other parties to appeal actively to the peasantry. Nahdatul Ulama, for instance, was very hesitant to create secular and ameliorative rural organizations. Although it was the most vital Islamic party of rural Java, it was based on the support of local *kijaji* who suspected any secular intrusion as a threat to their local control. 50 Masjumi failed due to its tendency toward over-centralizing - an inclination which cut it off from rural roots as soon as it began to develop them.

During the revolution, the PKI largely ignored the peasantry, but Musso had seen the need for rural land reform. 51 Assorted articles on the peasantry began to appear in PKI publications soon after the Madiun failure. In 1951 *Bintang Merah* came out with an issue dedicated to the agrarian question and drawing on a number of arguments which were to become central when the PKI directed more serious attention to the peasantry later on. Alimin, the only old leader of the 1920s to survive Madiun, wrote an article in *Suara Tani*, the paper produced by the *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BTI - peasant affiliate of the PKI), and drew on the tradition of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin for an argument that the PKI should turn to the peasantry and rural workers. He suggested a list of demands on behalf of peasants; a committee for land redistribution; a government to meet peasant needs, a bureau to inform peasants of modern techniques, a guarantee of cheap loans, an increase in rural cadres and schools, improved irrigation, rural cooperatives, better seeds, raised production, improved health services, and improved efficiency. Variations of all these demands became common in later PKI programs and demands. 52 In the same vein, Sakirman

argued that the nationalist revolution had completed the bourgeois phase of Indonesia's history and that the task of the workers and peasants was to unite and lead the national united front. 53

Organizing in the phase of Parliamentary Democracy focused on the drive for voting support rather than on concrete demands, but as the general political situation changed with the transition to Guided Democracy, the PKI became increasingly concerned with the quality as well as the quantity of its backing. In the Party congresses of 1959 there was an extensive re-evaluation of past work and attention to ideological work among and through cadres was increased. The basic argument in the 1959 meetings differed little from that Aidit made in his report to the 5th National Congress in March of 1954. At that time he argued that

We cannot possibly speak of a real, broad, and strong united front until the peasants have been drawn into it because, in our country, the peasants comprise more than 70% of the people ... Because of this, the primary task of the communists is to draw the peasants into the united front. This means that in order that the peasants can be drawn in, the most immediate task of the Indonesian Communists is to eliminate the survivals of feudalism, to develop the anti-feudal agrarian revolution, to confiscate the land of the landlords and give it free of charge to the peasants, as their own private property. The first step to be taken in our work among the peasants is to assist them in the struggle for their everyday needs, for the achievement of their partial demands. In this way, it will mean organizing and educating the peasants to a higher level of struggle. This is the foundation on which to create the alliance of workers and peasants as the basis of a powerful, united national front ... The agrarian revolution is the essence of the People's Democratic Revolution of Indonesia. 54

Although imperialism usually took top billing over feudalism as the appropriate immediate enemy of the PKI, this argument of Aidit's summarizes the main points of the PKI stance toward the peasantry.

Feudal remnants appeared as the major villain in the analyses of the 1957 PKI conferences as well. The agents of feudal oppression included landlord monopolies, high land rents, forced labor, and high interest rates. In effect

The continuous survival of feudalism has resulted in backwardness of agricultural technique, poverty for the majority of the peasants, the shrinking of the home market, and has rendered industrialization impossible. 55

In particular, the foreign plantations, forestry department, and landlords were considered enemies of the peasantry. Thus the Resolution of the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PKI included demands for the government to buy and distribute privately owned land, for the surrender of fallow plantation lands, for the release of forestry lands not critical for hydraulic purposes, and for the reduction of rents and interests. Within the Party there was criticism of inadequate study and organization among the peasants. 56 At the BTI national conference in the same year, there was similar criticism of cadre weakness in awareness of peasant problems and a long list of fairly specific demands geared to concrete needs of the poorer peasants and fishermen. 57

In his summary statement at the Sixth National Congress in 1959 Tentang Program PKI, Njoto drew on the same arguments. He mentioned that rural conditions had declined precipitously even in the years following independence and that responsibility for deterioration lay with remnants of feudal and imperial control. He called for increased concentration on peasant organizing with an immediate goal of a 6:4 ratio in favor of peasants paying land rents. His long range aims included redistribution of land, lower credit rates, abolition of forced labor, and the granting of land to squatters already on it. 58

At the First National Peasants Conference of the PKI in the same year, Hutapea offered some criticism of previous PKI peasant organizing. He condemned the tendency toward centralization in existing peasant organizations and stressed that local variations necessitated autonomy. He carefully distinguished between the form of cooperative the PKI was to work toward and the type urged by Hatta - as he saw it the liberal version involved coercion and was little better than a private company. He reported that in the six months prior to the conference cadres had failed miserably in the attempted implementation of the "three together" - that is in living, eating, and working with the villagers while at the same time studying Marxist-Leninism. Even while pointing to these problems, Hutapea suggested that the experiences gained through past efforts was a basis for more enlightened activism. 59

By this time the PKI had already carried out some research into rural conditions and could report some concrete statistics on village class structure, According to the PKI, villages averaged five to six thousand in population. The bulk of the people were poor peasants and landless laborers, neither having enough land for mere subsistence. Middle peasants included ten to fifteen percent of the population and had just enough to survive on; the rich minority controlled land, interests, and trade. Two villages were offered as more or less typical examples: Tjaruy in Central Java and Geluung in East Java. 60

	Tjaruy	Geluung
landlords	.25% pop:4.3% land	2.2%: 27%
rich peasants	1.5%	1%: 5%
middle peasants	11%	4.1%: 13%
poor peasants	43%	20%
laborers	44%	62%

In the same villages, peasants generally paid fully 50% of the crop and all production costs to owners who did not always work. When short on cash, peasants were frequently forced to sell crops in advance at 25-50% of the harvest prices and interest rates on loans went as high as 600% for six months. 61

With this image of rural class structure, the PKI felt confident that the sheer mass of the poorer people would lend force to the proposed alliance of workers and peasants. At the same time there were few illusions within the Party - the leaders explicitly admitted failure of serious work among the peasants up to that point. In his opening speech to the conference, Njoto stated that the worker-peasant alliance had not yet been made and that there were not nearly enough cadres working with the villagers. 62 He argued that as the situation had developed it was obvious that the PKI needed active support rather than passive voting from the rural masses.

The 1959 peasant conferences of the PKI and BTI set the tone for work among peasants through the period of Guided Democracy. In the early fifties, the Party had geared itself toward the electoral competitions of 1955 and 1957; with the sixties and the termination of the Parliamentary order, the PKI moved toward more active peasant involvement. In the earlier period the Party had sided with peasant squatters who had occupied estate lands during the anarchy of the revolution. Government attempts to remove them precipitated a whole series of confrontations. After 1960 the

passage of an agrarian reform bill offered a foothold on legitimacy for local PKI-BPI calls for land reform. The bill itself was moderate almost to the point of meaninglessness, but its enactment led up to the aksi sefihak, the unilateral seizure of land in the increasingly tense years before the coups and massacres of 1965 and 1966.

By December 1963, Aidit demonstrated considerably greater satisfaction with PKI work among the peasants. In his Political Report of the 7th Central Committee of the PKI, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat!*, he claimed Party success in the creation of a three million member mass Party which was at the same time a cadre Party. He claimed an additional seven million adult peasants in the BTI, a full quarter of the peasant population based on organizations existing in 50% of the villages. He stated that the PKI was firmly integrated with the masses, that the united front had become invincible, and that there were so many organized that no attempt to divide the Party could succeed.<sup>63</sup> He argued that the peasantry was the driving force, the basis, of the revolution and that they deserved the major portion of Party energy. At the same time, he held to the argument Marx and Engels made in the Peasant Question in France and Germany that

it has never happened and it will never happen in history that a peasant's revolution can be victorious without the leadership of the working class. It has never happened and it will never happen that the peasant forces predominate over the workers and are thus not beneficial to the revolution.<sup>64</sup>

Strategically he took an argument from Mao that the peasants could be important to the struggle as a source of food, soldiers, a place of retreat, and a basis for attack on the towns.<sup>65</sup> With the by then standard PKI formulas, he listed the major tasks of the peasant movement as the carrying out of the "six goods", the expansion and improvement of research, the expansion of the BTI mass base and creation of cooperatives, and the spreading of Marxist-Leninist education. The "six goods" included reduction of rents and a law on sharecropping, reduction of interest rates on loans, increase in the wages of peasant laborers, an increase in agricultural production and the extermination of rats, an increase in the cultural level of peasants, and an increase in peasant political consciousness.<sup>66</sup> Even while optimistic about PKI successes, he warned against cadre ideological laxness and concluded with five admonitions: to combine patriotism with proletariat internationalism, to remember that organization was important but ideology still more crucial, to remain flexible in

the application of principles, to become a mass and cadre Party simultaneously, and to become totally integrated with the peasantry. 67

Elsewhere he elaborated to argue that the strategy of integration with the villages aimed toward the development of a Party which would be of the village while at the same time transforming the peasantry - a reciprocal interaction. To achieve symbiosis it was obviously necessary to study the situation so that programs begun by cadres could respond to concrete and particular needs. The hope was that through initial involvement in petty actions peasant consciousness would be raised to a higher level of struggle. The stress was on integration with, but not absorption by the village, While familiarity was essential, cadres had to guard against the prestige their backgrounds lent them in peasant eyes. Sacrifice had to be expected and patience was necessary as cadres had to tolerate gains which came only slowly and in small steps. 68 To counteract recognized Party ignorance of rural conditions and needs, the PKI carried out a massive research project early in 1964. Although the results came in too late to have much effect, the concluding reports were used in cadre training.

The project was carried out between February and May and covered the whole of Java. Three thousand local cadres did the basic work and were coordinated by another three hundred working at regional and central levels of Party organization, Each cadre spent about six weeks - the total energy involved was impressive. The motivation was necessity rather than inclination as research served a number of purposes: achievement of familiarity with the largest sector of the population, enquiry into failure of agrarian reforms, experience for cadres, brochures for training, and a sense of how to integrate the Party with the people. 69 Everyone involved had to have had at least a junior high education and some training in Marxist theory. Then in going to their respective villages they were supposed to live according to the "three together" - again eating, living, and working with the peasants. 70 Concluding conferences were held to sum up the problem and local teams drew up concluding reports. 71 Overall the impression is that if the efforts achieved nothing else, a great many cadres had more extensive exposure to village life and conversely that many villagers experienced the PKI. Research and activism went hand in hand.

Although some of the researchers failed to carry out the "three together", the concluding reports emphasized that they were fundamental to "scientific" research and objectivity. In addition, the project confirmed a number of other directives to cadres: not to be absorbed into the villages, not to take a lecturing stance in teaching

the peasants, not to undermine the authority of heads of households, and not to take notes in front of the peasants. Conversely, there were four “musts”: to hold to the “three togethers”, to be humble and well groomed and to enjoy learning from the peasants, to know the language and local customs, and to carefully analyze the problems of household heads in order to agree with and support them. Cadres were enjoined to carry concern for the immediate interests of the villagers to the point of “changing the diapers of the peasants' children.” 72

One accomplishment of the project was the identification of seven “village devils”, the major enemies of peasants: landlords, money-lenders, tax farmers, middlemen, bureaucratic capitalists, authorities, and bandits. 73 Then there was confirmation that rural landlords were the most serious oppressor. In his report on the research in west Java, Kaum Tani Mengganjang Setan2 Desa, that landlords were the key to the countryside, that they controlled it in a very real sense. 74 He found that frequently landlords were also hadjis who used religious rationalizations in defending their wealth. Then, the PKI argument was that there may not have been vast scale landlord monopolies, but that the land was rich enough to make small holding lucrative and that it was the small scale of landlord holding which accounted for particular viciousness. 75 At the same time, the researchers pointed out that apparent small scale in holdings was belied by the common practice of placing land under relatives names to evade redistribution.

The problems of village economics were blamed on this economic oppression of poorer peasants and the only solution according to the PKI lay in peasant revolution and land redistribution. While research indicated that peasants were far too tolerant of their oppressors, Aidit still saw considerable prospect for an agrarian based movement. As poor peasants were the main productive force, he felt they had considerable power and could ally with others opposing the status quo, like the squatters on government lands. 76 Growing discontent was aided by deterioration of traditional culture under the impact of urban sprawls and rampant inflation. Aidit pointed out that customs such as the selamatan and figures such as the dalang were losing their grip - people took them less and less seriously. 77 Then in the rural areas, the PKI had inherited the spirit of the 1945 revolution and could draw on traditional folklore for propaganda. 78

Nowhere in this analysis is there any reference to the santri-abangan split as such; instead the PKI reports were consistently phrased in class terms. While there was



some tendency for class and religious schisms to coincide, the parallel was by no means complete. Geertz has reported that entrepreneurial types in towns tended to be santris but Jay offers a contrary image of smaller villages tending to be exclusively one or the other, across all class lines.<sup>79</sup> In his description of one rural election, Geertz makes it clear that the main lines of cleavage and format for conflict were both religious and traditional rather than according to class and economics. Local rivalries turned on contrasts between santri and abangan within the town and between town and country - class conflict entered in only inasmuch as it coincided with the cultural schism. In terms of format, the predominate conceptions were Javanese ideas of musjawarah-mufakat, gotong-rojong, and rukun; and that campaigning was carried out through a series of selamatans, not soap-box speeches. Although Geertz argues elsewhere that Javanese village institutions are coterminous with national institutions, from the village perspective the election competition was cast in traditional terms.<sup>80</sup>

Of course none of this is a refutation of the relevance of PKI class analysis to rural social structure. The fact that the peasants understood their difficulties in religious terms has been an objective reality of rural Java, but that has little to do with the actual nature of economic difficulties. The task for Marxist cadres is not changed by the fact that the point of reference for villagers has been religion rather than class, it is merely made more difficult. Then the point is not to get santri and abangan at each other's throats but to demonstrate to every poor peasant that his real enemies have been the landlords and money-lenders. With this in mind, PKI emphasis on class struggle remains comprehensible.

A further obstacle to PKI organizing lay in peasant passivity. Most people in any society are only marginally political, and if political only marginally ideological - even more so in Java. The Javanese peasantry have had a strong tendency to agree readily with directives from above, traditional etiquette of perintah alus required that, but then to go on doing whatever seemed appropriate. Writing about local chapters of the Sarekat Islam, Oates mentions that "the Sundanese peasant had the ability to compartmentalize ... to profess its aims without ever being concerned with their implementation."<sup>81</sup> In attempting to reach this base, the PKI relied heavily on already familiar forms. So PKI organized talks around Jogjakarta prior to the 1955 elections went hand in hand with ketoprak performances and the Party held festivals along with its rallies. Mass meetings were designed to remind people that they did not stand alone, but were balanced by house-to-house visiting to remind people of

the practical side or programs. Seloemardjan concluded in his study of the area around Jogja that

aside from the leaders of the party, it is doubtful whether the mass following understands the essence of a political ideology ... In talking to the village people the impression is strengthened that they join a political party for reasons other than its ideology. 82

Of the various parties, Seloemardjan suggested that the PKI gained the most from the residue of revolutionary spirit and from social changes connected to modern education.

Postrevolutionary youth is more apt to stand on its rights than to sacrifice them for the sake of social harmony. Semangat berdjung or fighting spirit has become the most respected trait in the character of the youth since independence. 83

Fighting during the revolution had concentrated in ethnic Javanese areas - another factor bending toward alliance between the Javanese and the PKI.

With these problems in politicizing the rural Javanese population, Party discipline and ideological rigor became natural centers of concern. There was a remarkable unity to the PKI through the whole Aidit period - as the Party expanded, Aidit's personal base naturally gained since new members entered under conditions he controlled. 84 With greater success and power came a tendency toward laxness, cadres closer to power lost militancy. While Aidit clearly wanted a massive united front, the drive toward quantity led to problems of quality. Mao succinctly posed the dilemma

If unity is sought through struggle, it will live;  
If unity is sought through yielding, it will perish. 85

Within the PKI the consequence was steadily increasing concern over self-satisfaction and ideological laxness. So Aidit stressed that ideology was more critical than organization and numerous speeches criticized cadre laxness, the tendencies either to sink to the level of the peasants or to take advantage of prestigious positions to become landowners. The leadership emphasized cadre humility and confessed that

only a very few really understood the essentials of Marxism. 86 The true test of Party strategy came with confrontations over land reform between 1960 and 1965. Discipline is always most critical in periods of struggle.

The land tenure patterns have varied greatly in Java - ranging from areas of strong communal ownership to those of individual ownership. Tenancy and share-cropping have varied similarly. At base the system has been one of private ownership with communal controls. Within villages, social standing has depended directly on relation to the land: original settlers became nuclear villagers who owned both land and houses, a second group might own either land or a house but not both, others owned neither and remained tenants. Ownership rotated in some areas and went along with extensive communal gotong-rojong projects. Villagers supported their kin who might lack land and believed that as many as possible should cooperate in cultivating crops. The result was what Geertz has termed "shared poverty", land became divided into smaller and smaller plots supporting more and more people. 87

The deterioration of traditional patterns came with Dutch introduction of improved health measures and the subsequent boom in population during the nineteenth century. Individuation spread; while in 1882 1.7 of 3.7 million hectares were individually owned, in 1932 the ratio was 5.4 to 6.6. 88 Reserve land and the limits of Javanese involution were used up by the 1930s. 89 Professor Brand of Leiden estimated that in the period between 1963 and 1965 there were about 15 million peasants on Java and Madura. Of those, 4.8 million were independent family workers, 6.9 million were independent farmers, .2 were employed labor, 3.1 were landless farmers. 90 A University of Indonesia survey recently estimated that 10 million out of the rural population of 27 million Javanese could be considered surplus labor. 91 The main problem has been population pressure rather than unequal distribution.

At the same time, van der Kroef argued that the social conditions of rural Java conformed fairly closely to PKI analysis. He points out that around World War I 72% of Javanese landowners held only 36% of the land while 1% Owned 7.6%. 92 The class breakdown he provides and the statistics he gives for several villages both support PKI images. 93 He also mentions that "The Muslim kijaji in the village society ... was often most representative of the developing Indonesian landowner and landlord class." 94 Rural indebtedness spread rapidly after 1900 with the penetration of the money economy, increases in taxes, and the pressures of

population. Some studies showed concentrations of up to 50% of the land under absentee ownership. 95

Resulting disjunction naturally lent itself to PKI agitation as van der Kroef argued in 1960 that

The Communist Party is then the only organization in Indonesia today which advocates a forceful solution to the problem of agrarian overpopulation; and its success in winning adherents in the countryside by this program can hardly be questioned. Given the continuing political instability in the country and its sluggish economic development, Java's land tenure problem may well become the tinderbox for a kind of conflagration ... 96

On the one hand, he stressed that the PKI offered the most viable channel toward upward mobility for the younger generation of rural landless peasants and that the BTI was seen by the peasantry as a useful tool against landlords. 97 On the other, he argued that PKI appeals to the peasantry were its main strengths. 98 In this there was clearly a symbiosis through which the PKI linked peasantry and politics. The question of Party competence and peasant ideological intensity is separate - and here it becomes clear that Aidit's stress on ideology was appropriate. For the organizational connection was an essential step but not a conclusion. While the Party leadership stressed restraint and responsibility through small and successful actions, they had tapped a source of rural energy without disciplining it to strategies planned at the top.

Land reform is a predictable step in modernization of agrarian societies. As Ismail Ajami has argued in his dissertation on land reform, as social changes occur with the penetration of a money economy, different social sectors respond with different rates of change. The consequence is a build-up of social tension, of strains as lagging sectors fail to balance with more advanced developments. He suggested that traditional systems of land tenure resist change and that the general result is impoverishment of the peasants and concentration of ownership until some catalyst touches off drastic change. In the cases he dealt with, changes in land tenure from above came too late to resolve tensions and in effect accelerated the process. 99 The conclusion works here.

The main effect of Indonesia's Basic Agrarian Act of 1960 was to raise rural expectations rather than resolve tensions. The law was designed to complete the transition from colonial to national agrarian structure and was not geared to developmental needs. Underlying it, there was an assumption that the State should not own land and it was stipulated that exchanges of land ownership should remain subject to communal approval - it was more of an attempt to step back to adat than forward to cooperatives. Selosoemardjan reported that the basic principles were that agrarian land should belong to the tiller, that primary rights belonged exclusively to Indonesians, that absentee ownership was allowed only for those in state service, and that economically weak farmers should be protected. 100 The law stipulated a minimum of 2 hectares per nuclear family and a maximum for Java and Bali of either 5 hectares of sawah (irrigated fields) or 6 of ladang (dry fields). In fact the average holding per nuclear family has been closer to 0.5 hectare and it is immediately obvious why the reform brought no real change. 101

Even if the reform had been rigorously carried out, only 4% of West Java's agricultural land would have been subject to redistribution and the situation was no better through the rest of Java. 102 Then in fact very little was done to ensure compliance with the law since enactment depended entirely on local administrative initiative. Pauker concluded that

What emerges clearly is that either because of the opposition of vested interests, or due to bureaucratic ineptitude, or for lack of available land for redistribution land reform had only a very minor impact by 1964. 103

In fact all three of those factors worked together. Once the law existed, however, the PKI picked up on it as a theme which could draw more militant peasant support. The law offered a rare chance to criticize the administration on its own terms and through that to evade accusations of betrayal. Although the law meant very little in itself, it had a profound impact on the situation. As a Marxist Party the PKI was ultimately committed to communal rather than individual ownership, but it could support this law as a step in the fight against feudal survivals. The BTI offered qualified approval along with considerable criticism when the law first appeared, but complete implementation of the law became a regular theme in the BTI journal *Pembangunan Desa*.

Through the early sixties, agrarian unrest crystallized around the question of land tenure and tended to polarize the peasantry according to the prevailing santri-abangan schism. As I suggested earlier, the fact that tension broke along religious lines does not explain its development. While the form struggle took might have been a consequence of pre-existing social forms, the sources of strain were certainly economic. Explanation and description are separate analytical processes. Javanese newspapers of the early sixties were filled with mutual recriminations and reports of rural clashes. In some areas government troops clashed with squatters on estate lands, in others local BTI units met with organized Muslim resistance to unilateral seizures. From press reports it would seem that the main lines of conflict were religious.

In November 1961 there was an incident at the Djengkol estate near Kediri. In the end a demonstration of 3000 peasants confronted local military and police units - six were killed and eighteen wounded. 105 According to the conservative Djawa Pos, the peasants were armed with knives and had been organized and taken to the estate by a "certain group", obviously the BTI. From this point of view, the government had merely been following through with its plan to consolidate several scattered estates which had been occupied by squatters. The Djawa Pos stressed that the peasants had been informed well in advance, that they had been granted five or six hundred rupiahs apiece, that they had been moved to other estate lands where they were granted legal rights, and that 525 peasants had been peacefully moved until the RBI stepped in. In addition, the police had given warning and fired into the air before shooting the demonstrators. 106

At the trial of the BTI cadre Muljodarmo, who was accused of precipitating the incident, other factors appeared. In his defense he argued that the peasants had had no objection to the planned move, but that they had become angry when officials had moved in and plowed their fields under just before harvest. At the same trial, the estates official testified that the squatters had been there since just after the Second World War: the land had belonged first to the Dutch, then the Japanese, and finally to the Indonesian government. Due to lack of funds it had remained undeveloped and the squatters had been granted permission to remain. Then in 1954 the governor of East Java reaffirmed their right. In 1957, however, the estates service had decided to consolidate it with several other estates and in 1961 they had tried to resettle the squatters. The assistant regent of Kediri stated that the farmers had replanted the tractored land and were trying to do it again when the military blocked them. 107

Trompet Masyarakat, the main Surabaya PKI newspaper, further reported that nine had been killed and twenty-five wounded - rather than the six and eighteen reported by Djawa Pos. 108 Muljodarmo was initially sentenced to nineteen months imprisonment for provoking peasants to illegal action, but the sentence was raised to three years in his attempted appeal. 109 The East Javanese military command temporarily suspended the major PKI and BTI publications for their reporting of the incident. 110 Although only minor factual disagreements come through in the reporting, the differences of perspective between newspapers is obvious - there was clearly a substantial split in the way events appeared to conservative and radical observers. They did not experience the same reality in the same way.

Similar confrontation occurred between squatters and forestry officials. In October 1964 a mob of 2000 peasants armed with knives and axes attacked seven state forestry policemen in Indramaju, West Java. 111 Conflicts spread elsewhere as local BTI units would organize crowds of peasants to petition landlords and village lurahs (heads) in order to carry out land reform. Then the PKI and BTI urged peasants to unilaterally withhold crop payments in excess of the law that had been passed to guarantee a 6:4 ratio in favor of cultivators. 112 Landlord and lurah terrorizing of the peasants increased - several incidents were reported of landowners using urban gangs to intimidate peasants presenting petitions. 113 The hirelings had beaten up local BTI and PKI leaders in Sumput and at Djombang the BTI leader was stoned and knifed. 114 At Petjinen village the BTI led a delegation of twenty-nine peasants with a petition to the lurah demanding that landlords sign agreements to the crop-sharing laws. The lurah ignored them saying that "there are no forms for such agreements" and that "the village secretary is busy". 115 At Djember the local BTI demanded severe penalty for a landlord who had killed a BTI leader who was on the Land Reform Committee. 116 The Probolinggo BTI complained of rental laws for sugar land - the peasants were forced to rent their land out at Rp20,000 per ha when they could have been making Rp90,000 by planting themselves. 117

Scattered gains came through the BTI as well. The BTI at Djember reported that peasants in nearby villages had won a case - poor peasants had handed over 187 quintals of rice for Rp72,000 while the rich peasants they gave it to received that much from the government for only 72 quintals. The poor won their case and only had to hand over 72 quintals. In Mumbulsari 116 tobacco growers had been forced to sell at Rp4,000 per quintal during the planting season and the buyers had sold it at Rp20,000 after the harvest. Pressed by the peasants, the company surrendered

another Rp6,000 per quintal. 118 Also, BTI organized peasants had unilaterally taken over a large number of British estates in East Java. 119

Local army and Muslim groups responded to the aksi sefihak with warnings that the PKI should work through the legal framework of Land Reform Committees rather than taking the law into their own hands. 120 Nahdatul Ulama and PKI mobilized crowds were organized to counter BTI-PKI protests. At one court hearing into the beating of a BTI cadre by a lurah the PKI masses showed up at the first hearing and a crowd of 5000 PNI-NU supporters of the lurah confronted them at the next one. Police confiscated the signs the PKI group had brought. 121 Muslim groups spread reports, or lies depending on the perspective, to the effect that the PKI had issued anti-Muslim statements. 122 At Banjuwangi 500 Muslim youths went to their lurah to protest a dalang's "slur" against Islam - in the process yelling for the "crushing of atheists". 123

Obor Revolusi reported that a PKI-BTI mass had stepped on the Koran and entered a mosque with dirty feet to harass a respected NU scholar. 124 Obor Revolusi held that responsibility for growing tensions rested with the BTI supported aksi sefihak, but that communist attacks on Islam were even more serious than the seizure of land. 125 Their argument was that the peasant movement resulted from cadre intimidation of the peasants. 126

In response to Obor Revolusi reporting, communist papers denied the sacrilege. They said that there had been rumors that the PKI planned to destroy the mosque, but that they had been provocations and that the PKI had sent a delegation to the sub district chief denying the reports. A delegation of Muslims arrived at the same time to confirm the rumor. The sub district chief had then stationed a security team at the mosque and a large crowd of Muslims with knives had assembled. An NU man named Salim had tried to tell the crowd that the rumor was false, but they had accused him of trying to cover it up.

While waiting for the supposed communist attack, the Muslims had performed knife demonstrations and attracted a large crowd since it was lebaran, the major Muslim holiday. When two men, Muljono and Ridwan, happened to walk by and stop to ask what was going on, several of the Muslims pointed out Ridwan as a PKI veteran. The whole crowd then chased the two, but they managed to get away and the mob ended up venting its energy through the destruction of property. While Obor Revolusi



reported the incident as the Kanigoro affair after the name of the mosque; Djalan Rakjat Triweekly reported it as the Tanggul incident after the place where the destruction occurred. 127 Whatever the facts of the incident, it got considerable press and seriously strained PKI-NU relations in Djakarta. 128 Obor accused the PKI of stirring up troubles by calling others counter-revolutionary and supporting aksi sefihak; Trompet blamed tension in East Java on ex-Masjumi elements (trying to avoid blaming NU by instead pointing to an already discredited group). 129 Whatever the facts of the case, Muslim group consistently argued that communist religious transgressions were the major source of strain.

As far as the motivations of Muslim crowds are concerned, there is little doubt but that the Muslim papers were correct - even if for no other reason than that the papers themselves harped on the theme incessantly. In fact, the PKI said little about religion except to stress that it had nothing against Islam per se and only objected to it as a tool of vested interests. PKI papers were restrained in criticisms and always careful to aim barbs at organizations rather than Islam itself. At the same time, they pointed to the legality of everything they were fighting for and argued that it was in the spirit of Nasakom, Manipol, gotong-rotong, and the rest. In May 1965 there was a clash between the BTI and the students at the Islamic school of Gontor - several were wounded and sixteen BTI houses were burned down by students claiming to defend land assigned for religious purposes. 130 This is a fine example of the universal pattern through which landowners attempt to evade laws by "donating" their land to religious institutions. At least to some extent, it is clear that vested interests relied on religious appeals in marshalling mass defense of the status quo. What real hostility the communists felt for Muslims is better explained by consistent Muslim resistance to reforms which benefitted the masses than as an outgrowth of theoretical repudiation of religion.

As tension spread, local BTI units were the most vociferous in pushing for unilateral actions. Higher Party officials mouthed approval, but tried to cool the situation down by stressing the need for discipline and restraint. By early 1965 they could see the danger of polarization and tried to shift the emphasis of Party activity away from land reform. There are some, but only a few, references to serious tension within the PKI. Obor Revolusi mentions that the aksi sefihak represented only one group and not the united front. 131 Then in the Balinese Suara Indonesia there is a reference to the trial of Prio Maslur at Rembang in Central Java. He had been taken to court as a member of the illegal "PKI-Malam", a group dedicated to the violent correction of

internal deviations in the PKI. 132 In 1953 Kamaluddin, Secretary of the East Javanese PKI, expressed serious concern at the extent of rural disorder and suggested that even though the mass political consciousness was advanced, caution was necessary due to the number of gangs and troublemakers. 133 In late 1964 Njoto made a speaking tour of East Java and urged negotiations rather than armed conflict in the solution of the land question. 134

In his Political Report to the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the PKI in May of 1965, Aidit had much to say about the aksi sefihak. He stated that much of the existing tension had been needlessly generated because cadres had not been satisfied with small actions. Aidit repeated his past directive to minimize targets and stress discipline. He argued that cadres had to follow the main outline of Party strategy, implying strongly that they had not been, and that they should not fool themselves by following their subjective desires for quick victory. 135 He considered unrest a test of the revolution and a sharpening of contradictions. In trying to counter polarization, he focused on the continuing need to expand the rural base of the Party and the necessity for the PKI of defending the interests of all of the people rather than just of a few groups. 136 The leadership continued to lean toward legitimate activities with a strategy of accommodation to Djakarta politics; the masses bent increasingly toward immediate accomplishment of concrete goals.

Through 1965 the military and Muslims became more restive. The Sukarno-PKI move toward Peking in foreign policy threatened to cut the army off from Soviet arms and seemed as though it might lead to arms for the masses instead. 137 There were rumors early in the year that Sukarno's health was failing and that he was working toward PKI assumption of power at his death. 138 The Muslims hated the PKI and doubted Sukarno and were thus willing to cement an alliance with the army. 139 The coup itself brought all these fears and tensions to a head. With the coup it became obvious that the PKI had completely lost the initiative - army control came quickly as everyone scrambled to ally themselves with a new center of political security. 140 In the killings that followed, Muslim youth groups were the main agent of killing. 141 The Party leadership never recovered from the first events of the coup. A small group attempted to begin guerrilla warfare in the area around Mount Merapi in Central Java, but the PKI had not prepared for armed struggle and the attempt was negligible. 142

Out of this third “white terror”, fragments of the PKI began evaluating the sources of failure. The Marxist-Leninist group most sympathetic to the fallen leadership published an evaluation in the East German *Horizont* in 1969. This moderate Marxist group found fault with Maoist “adventurist” tactics which had isolated the Party and stressed that the time for armed struggle was only after very thorough organizing. The task for a new Party was to function first through the legal framework in order to convince the masses that previous failure had been the responsibility of just a few leaders rather than of Marxism. The strategy outlined differed little from that pursued by Aidit - the implication to them was that the 1965 coup was an unfortunate accident which might be avoided through more careful organizing in another attempt. 143

A Trotskyite pamphlet of 1966 included several arguments. Joseph Hansen blamed the defeat on Peking and Moscow for having allied with Sukarno and the Indonesian bourgeoisie - thus blocking the formation of a truly revolutionary Party. 144 Ernest Mandel argued that the initiative had been taken by the army and that the failure of the Party stemmed from its attempt to take over gradually through formation of a united front. 145 Mandel agreed with the Statement of the United Secretariat of the 4th International in March of 1966 - there the Party was chastised for accepting the idea of revolution through stages, for granting leadership to Sukarno, and for failing to respond to the army coup. 146 Sudarsono, a refugee from the PKI, criticized its leadership for having believed that socialism could have come peacefully. 147

By far the most thorough critique came from the Maoist group. Their self-criticism of the Aidit leadership appeared in the Albanian Indonesian Tribune in 1967. In this criticism, “Hold High the Banners of the Three Magic Weapons of the Revolution”, the Polit Bureau of a new Central Committee of a new PKI cited rightist deviation of the Aidit leadership as the main source of weakness. According to them, Aidit was doomed from the Beginning for trying to make Marxism the possession of the whole nation rather than just the proletariat. He denied the class struggle and tried to suppress it in his efforts to control the *aksi sefihak*. The PKI had committed itself to Parliamentary struggle and was never really serious in its efforts to reach the masses - “In practice, the work in the countryside was made to serve the work in the towns and cities.” 148 The Party had discouraged actions against the “village devils” and instead had supported a bourgeois state. Even the worker based seizure of foreign estates had ultimately benefitted only the bourgeoisie since the nation was not socialist. 149 The new group criticized the old leadership for promoting a “civil

service" atmosphere and for denying class struggle through conformity to the slogans of Guided Democracy. 150 As Rex Mortimer has put it, the critiques "perceive the 1965 debacle as the culmination of a long period of degeneration in the ranks of the PKI." 151

In his evaluation of the coup and its circumstances, Wertheim is somewhat more tolerant of the Aidit leadership. He argued that the source of conflict prior to the coup was the growing class struggle represented by the aksi sefihak. According to him

the poor peasantry had become restive and could no longer be prevented from voicing claims which did not fit within the Marhaenist ideology and the Nasakom political pattern ... The PKI evidently did not sufficiently realize that in starting these campaigns against larger landowners, they were abandoning Sukarno's diluted socialism and adopting a clean-out class-struggle position. It was inevitable that in doing so they would irrevocably alienate the Muslim partner in the Nasakom coalition, the Nahdatul Ulama which, in Central and East Java mainly represented the well-to-do landowner class. 152

Perhaps the dilemma for the PKI in the early sixties was that described by Franz Fanon in his writing on radical revolutions of the third world. As he saw it, "There is no contamination of the rural movement by the urban movement; each develops according to its own dialectic". 153 More specifically, he argued that natural tension develops between urban leaders and rural followers of parties. Peasants rediscover politics

no longer as a way of lulling people to sleep nor as a means of mystification, but as the only method of intensifying the struggle and of preparing the people to undertake the governing of their country clearly and lucidly. The leaders of the rebellion come to see that even very large scale peasant risings need to be controlled and directed into certain channels. These leaders are led to renounce the movement in so far as it can be termed a peasant revolt, and to transform it into a revolutionary war ... They discover that the success of the struggle presupposes clear objectives, a definite methodology, and above all the need for the masses of the people to realize that their unorganized efforts can only be a temporary dynamic. 154

The test for PKI strategy came with confrontations over land reform between 1960 and 1965. My argument is that this issue and the social conditions associated with it were responsible for the breakdown of accommodation between the PKI and other political forces, mainly the military and Muslims. For while the leadership of the Party continued to pursue a line of adjustment with the hope that it could then win power from the top, the rural masses who had been activated by the PKI were not sufficiently politicized, not disciplined to leadership strategy. The consequence was direct peasant efforts to seize land, efforts directed at best by local cadres and not in response to strategies of the leadership.

For the PKI the results were disastrous. In the first place the conflicts tended to fall in line with the existing religious schism rather than class struggle - the peasants at the base lacked a proper class consciousness. At the same time, the spreading conflicts doomed leadership hopes of winning power at the center since they precipitated a repressive response from military and Muslim leaders. There was an unnecessary polarization which the leadership had not prepared for. There was a separation within the Party between left-wing adventurism at the base and right-wing deviation of the elite. Contrary to Mao's dictum, division came through struggle at the base and weakness through yielding at the top. The Party elite concentrated on unity and the projection of an image of power and responsibility; mass action injected the question of class struggle.

## ALL THINGS ARE ONE

So far I have tried to establish several major points. In the first place, I have argued that there is an ideological congruence between Javanese mystical and Western Marxist thought. Then that the limits of that congruence help explain the nature of the accommodation reached between Sukarno's Guided Democracy and Aidit's PKI. From the Marxist perspective, the PKI identification with the contemporary embodiment of the Javanese mystical tradition amounted to rightist deviation - the alliance demanded abdication of the class struggle. Then at the same time, there was a split within the Party. While the leadership focused on a drive toward power at the center, the rural masses had been activated but not directed by the Party. The masses took to leftist adventurist tactics through unilateral actions, in the process recalling the Javanese millennial tradition. In this final section I will try to relate these specific conclusions to a more general framework of dialectical thought. At this point I can be suggestive, but by no means exhaustive. I will not try to map the floor of an ocean I have just stepped into, but I do not have to be too daring to report that the waters are warm and delicious.

I began by presenting a sketch of the situation of independent Indonesia and by trying to establish the basic limits of the PKI's context. In doing so my argument was that it is essential to relate political, social, and economic structures if explanation rather than description is the object. So the political tensions of Indonesia only make sense when related to the underlying socio-economic structures. Conversely, economic development and modernization depend on political as well as technical factors. The point is that to genuinely grapple with the problems of any situation requires analysis of interrelations at the most general level. Any method which suggests focus on isolated factors is in effect taking the rest of the situation as an assumed constant - it is doomed from the start. Of course if the object of effort is description it is perfectly legitimate and necessary to isolate phenomena. In fact, however, that is to strip them of their real meaning since everything exists only through its relation to its context. So for example, to study Indonesian economic growth and begin by taking the geographical limits of Indonesia as the basic unit of analysis is to admit defeat by confining analysis to ameliorative efforts. Indonesia's economy is merely one segment of an international economy - to deal only with that segment is to take its international connections for granted and implicitly to assume that those international connections are not the source of difficulties. That is ridiculous.

In outlining the fundamental cleavages within Indonesia, I dealt first with the contrast between the Outer Islands and Java. Through most of the fifties that conflict dominated national politics. In the early stages of Parliamentary Democracy the Outer Island interests had predominated - the Outer Islanders tended to be those most closely tied to modern sectors of the economy and modernistic Islam. Thus at the same time they were the portion of the population most congenial to Western interests and practices. Regional tension came to a head in the late fifties and resulted in the temporary elimination of Outer Island and Masjumi interests.

In the phase of Guided Democracy which followed, Sukarno attempted to reinstate traditional Javanese conceptions and create internal unity through concentration on external enemies. Within Java, the primary social tension has been that between more purely Javanese and more thoroughly Islamic groups, the abangan and the santri. That religious schism accounts for the initial successes of the PKI as it began to reorganize after the disaster at Madiun. Later the PEI began to transcend the schism and gain adherents through more strictly class appeals, but the schism accounts for the initial successes which enabled it to become one of the central actors under Guided Democracy.

At the grass-roots of the Party there was an alliance of pre-capitalistic village communalism with modern communism; at the top there was an accommodation between Javanese mystical and modern dialectical thought. Sukarno and his fellow nationalists could empathize with Marxism not only because it offered an especially sensible analysis of their immediate situation, but also because the structure of Marxist thought resembles that of the Indic and Javanese tradition which was still alive for them. On the other hand, the congruence between systems was limited to common basis in dialectical awareness and did not extend to include Marxist conceptions of class struggle. While the conclusion for Javanese has been in striving toward unity, the Marxist emphasis has been on conflict. In each case there is a similar sense of the inter-relatedness of being and an unwillingness to take existing social relations as a final and acceptable reality, but the resulting directions of action differ.

For the Javanese there has been an essentially mystical conviction that the aim of existence lies in achievement of a selamet state of mind. For the Marxist there is the contrary conviction that individuals should strive to change the social, political, and

economic circumstances for everyone. According to the Javanese notions of kingship and power, general social justice follows from the ruler's mystical touch with the cosmos. According to the Marxists, social Justice and freedom depend on the Party's capacity to organize and channel energy from the productive masses into politics. In the Javanese view, social harmony naturally flows from symbolic insight into the way things are naturally ordered. To the Marxist that harmony only follows comprehension of social reality and the releasing of implicit but real desires of the masses. To the Javanese symbols are the keys to order through understanding. To the Marxist organization is the key to expression of mass energy, to freedom.

In relating the two images, it might help to visualize a recycling fountain of water. Both the mystical and the Marxist senses of the unity and interrelatedness of things suggest the image as a model for the flow of energy, of power. In turning to action, the Marxist looks to the lower portion of the cycle and argues that continuation depends on upward flow of water; the mystic looks to the upper portion and argues that flow depends on outward movement from the concentration of power at the spout. There is something of this in the relation between the systems of thought. To the Javanese, the king creates order through his mystical power to serve as a node connecting the two dimensions of cosmic and social order. To the Marxist, the Party must embody the objective and scientific ideology of dialectical materialism in order to perform the same function. Neither king nor Party is considered an agent of anything but universal forces. In each case one dimension is that of Truth and Unity, the other that of social order.

In Indonesia the Aidit PKI acted according to patterns which match Javanese mystical at least as well as Western Marxist conceptions. To the leadership the mass organization was important more for its symbolic than for its concrete functions. There was an organization expressing mass discontent, but that expression was less important than the fact that massive scale created a popular belief that the PKI was the established locus of genuine power and responsibility. So within the Party scale was central and quality of politicization and tightness of organization were secondary.

All this in line with Anderson's comment that "In the Javanese game of politics being known to 'have power' is the surest way to acquiring more of it." <sup>1</sup> He goes on to speculate that perhaps



the strategy of the PKI in the period 1963-1965 of trying to create a sense of an irresistible tide flowing in their direction, a snow-balling accumulation of adherents, was a partly conscious harnessing of traditional ideas about the flow of power from a decaying to a rising center. 2

Further, Anderson mentions that PKI success came to some extent through the success with which its "initiation" procedures paralleled induction into traditional pesantren. Then the nature of the knowledge offered bore a resemblance to that offered through traditional education in mystical schools - in each case the insight achieved was seen as both ultimate and comprehensive as an explanatory framework. 3 Overall, Anderson concluded that Sukarno and the PKI were the main creative Javanisers of Indonesian politics and that the consequence was an internalization rather than resolution of social tensions. 4

From the Javanese perspective, the PKI found much of its appeal in authoritarian conceptions of the Party and its ideology, conceptions more in line with Javanese tradition than Western notions of liberal democracy. From the Marxist perspective, the Party ended by taking a rightist and subjective deviation - appeals were based on existing popular understandings rather than on underlying concrete needs. By doing this, the PKI essentially accepted the existing subjective reality and through that played the game of politics according to existing terms - rather than attempting seriously to change the format of action for everyone. Through its accommodation to the Sukarno regime, the PKI followed a strategy designed to accumulate power at the center rather than to build support from a disciplined base.

At the base of PKI organization there was an appeal to the pervasive Javanese millennial tradition. Soedjatmoko has commented that

Millenarian movements of this kind, because of their total rejection of the present, are not reformist, but essentially revolutionary ... In fact the PKI made very effective use of many so-called "mystical societies" and of their chiliastic expectations to recruit its own members and maintain their revolutionary fervor. 5

So in fact the PKI found some of its firmest supporters among the most mystically inclined of the Javanese peasants. This more traditional group was the sector suffering most through the decline of ancient rural institutions precisely because it

was the group most thoroughly immersed in and committed to those institutions. Others had already been shaken loose from their roots and had begun to adjust to changing social realities - those who had clung most firmly to tradition suffered most extremely at its loss. At the same time, the Javanese tradition had much more in common with Marxism than did the later Islamic and Western accretions.

Evidence of empathy is clear in the appearance of mystical-Marxist sects following the purges of 1966. The Suharto government spent a good deal of energy trying to clear rural Java of vestiges of the PKI - in doing so it eliminated a number of quasi-religious and millennial groups which seemed to have PKI-Sukarno sympathies. In March 1967 the government killed 80 people at the village of Nginggil in East Java and publicized it as the squashing of a PKI comeback. The movement had congealed around Mbah Suro, a man claiming to have mastered all the serious arts of the classical seer: he began as a lurah (village head), became a dukun (spirit healer), then a dalang (wajang puppeteer), in short he seemed a fully fledged orang sakti (holy man) and commanded considerable respect. He took four wives from villages at the various directions of the compass and he collected a powerful assortment of pusaka (magical objects). As his popularity and following grew, he began to become the focus of a millennial sect and he prophesied arrival of the Ratu Adil, the messiah or Just Prince. He predicted an apocalyptic bloodbath directed against those responsible for the killings of 1966 and identified the army as the raksasas, the daemons of the wajang.

His wajang performances had both mystical and political content and his followers received military as well as mystical training. The initials for the magical regalia which were supposed to make his followers invulnerable were IKP, the reverse of the PKI. His closest associate was a former PKI man named Suradi and he was the head of the guard. Apparently many of those who gathered around Mbah Suro were refugees from the PKI who had turned to this mystical sect in the period of mass killings. So it was after the fall of Sukarno and the PKI that Mbah Suro became important. Groups of his followers were seen publicly in Surabaya and government officials became convinced that the movement was in fact a clandestine PKI cell.

The immediate provocation leading to government military action was the circulation of a millennial chain letter predicting the imminence of a huge battle and subsequent establishment of a period of perfect social order and justice. <sup>6</sup> However important or trivial the connection between Mbah Suro and the PKI, it is clear

enough that the public accepted equation between mystical and Marxist ideas and that in fact some of the same people were attracted to both variants of protest. For years Mbah Suro had practiced his magic and mysticism without particular notice, but in the wake of massive social upheaval and the elimination of Sukarno and the PKI as points of reference for those who could not accept the status quo, millennial sentiment blossomed. All of this lends credence to the common suggestion that the PKI had reached a mass base under Guided Democracy, but had only a superficial hold on it.

At the upper levels the nature and limits of the PKI's relation to Guided Democracy are best understood through the old Javanese ideas of politics; at the base of the PKI the relation between the Party and its peasant supporters becomes clear only through a sense of the social conditions and millennial traditions of rural Java. At each level the nature of the relationship helps explain the ultimate failure of the alliances reached. Van der Kroef and Pauker have argued that the PKI had seized the initiative during Guided Democracy, that it controlled the situation more than any other force and had taken over the major symbols of nationalism. Van der Kroef argued that the ideological interchange between the PKI and Guided Democracy was reciprocal in that

the party also seeks to transform these symbols, sometimes quite subtly, in terms of its own ideological and tactical objectives; it "radicalizes" the approved state ideology, pressing it with its interpretations, into the directions which it wishes the nation to travel. 7

Along with Pauker, he predicted that the PKI might have dominated Indonesia through acclamation, through general acceptance that the PKI was the only viable power and ought to be recognized as such. 8

Somewhat more perceptively, Pluvier and Anderson have taken the reverse image of the same interaction. Pluvier argued that

By supporting Sukarno's policy of stepped-up nationalism the PKI has in fact become the prisoner of the very factors which, as a communist party, it should fight. 9

Making a similar point much more subtly, Anderson argued that the Indonesian national language

symbolizes and expresses the conquest of modernism via a new language which at the same time is becoming anchored in a traditional conception of the world, and a deep-rooted vision of the nature of being. 10

Then as far as PKI terminology was concerned that

the traditional Marxist formulas of class struggle were subtly transformed into a style of propaganda where there was essentially one Rakjat with all its deserving components, not so much arrayed against an adversary class as against small clusters of "foreign" elements, who by their reactionary or compradore character endangered the wholeness and the unity of the nation.

11

As I see it, the PKI was led into deviation, and here I have to agree with Pluvier and Anderson, through the extreme constraints of the political situation on the one hand and the feasibility" of alliance with Sukarno and his abangan supporters on the other. The Party had to accept the limits of the national ideology or sacrifice legal existence for an armed struggle it would have been in no shape to wage.

For Sukarno everything was one and all points of view could come together. His framework remained Javanese even if he might have resisted the comparison in which Lubis concludes that "Marxist-Leninist dialectics pale besides the Mahabharata and the mythico-mystical teachings of dukuns and gurus." Or as Mitchell puts it, Sukarno

wanted to have the conflicts that it had brought to his Java resolved in the way Java had resolved such conflicts in the past by the communists becoming Javanized, so that Marx and Lenin could settle down peaceably alongside Mohammed, Bhatara Kala and old Semar. 13

In evaluating Sukarno's career, Dahm suggested that this pervasive commitment to unity was the reason for his ultimate fall. Sukarno did not reject his original ideas but "he refused to depart from them after their value had come into question."14 To Dahm it seemed that submission of all groups to a single order could only strangle

progress. That conclusion might apply equally to the PKI in its abdication of the class struggle. In his speeches at his trial following the coup, Sudisman made heavy-use of the Javanese word “manunggal” (to become one), but at the same time he concluded

that the Party had compromised too far with bourgeois and liberal tendencies, and had insufficiently emphasized the class struggle. 15

Other indications confirm that the PKI had softened considerably during the early sixties. As the leaders of the Party began to assume roles in government as well, they moved into more impressive houses and in general began to show signs of personal wealth. In writing about the ludruk theater in Surabaya, Peacock noted the soft and bourgeois trend within the PKI and confirmed that it had become much too passive a partner in the Nasakom coalition. 16

In a very crucial sense, the conceptions underlying Guided Democracy were based on a social order which had already been too far undermined to revive. Muslim groups and Outer Islanders generally could not understand or empathize with Sukarno on his own terms. They had both become tied to economic and social forms related in concrete interest and general world view to the West. The bulk of the student population in universities throughout the islands were not from abangan areas of Java - to them Sukarno's rhetoric appeared as nothing more than shallow duplicity. 17 Never having been a part of the traditional order which had still had some grip on the revolutionary generation of 1945, the generation of 1966 could have no part of Sukarno's mystical synthesis. Then the military could concur with emphasis on national unity, but not to the point of accepting the PKI.

In short, both Sukarno and the PKI functioned in terms of ideas having little meaning for powerful sections of the nation they spoke to. Times had changed and the ideology had become something of an anachronism - at least in the form through which it was presented by Sukarno and the PKI. They had acted in terms of symbolic and cosmological senses of power which were losing their grip on the masses. Even when those conceptions touched individuals, the sentiments of unity did little to resolve the basic economic and political dilemmas of the nation. Viewing developments from the perspective of the Javanese and Marxist losers, it is obvious that neither was properly in touch with the cosmos, that neither truly embodied the historical moment (to use Hegel). A recent Czech lesson is appropriate - the pen is mightier than the sword, but tanks are another matter.

In a curious sense, judgments of either Marxist parties or Javanese rulers are harsher than evaluation liberal Westerners might direct at themselves. As far as Marxists or Javanese are concerned, a post hoc ergo propter hoc logic is appropriate. Just as with any form of magic, failure indicates nothing about method except that it was incorrectly applied. Theory is inviolable and only application is subject to judgment. Thus for Marxists any failure prompts reinterpretation which from the Western perspective seems merely crude rewriting of history. Similarly, the fall of a Javanese ruler would indicate to his subjects that he had already lost touch with the macrocosmos. Method is never subject to doubt because it is rooted in a reality explicitly transcending the actions or expressions of any individual - the ultimate. As Marcuse puts it

Theory accompanies the practice at every moment, analyzing the changing situation and formulating its concepts accordingly. The concrete conditions for realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains the same and theory remains its ultimate guardian. Theory will preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice deviates from its proper path. Practice follows the truth, not vice versa. 18

In judging individual actions, the moral intentions and efforts of the agent become irrelevant - only his function is subject to evaluation. Merleau-Ponty has made the point quite forcefully

man is simply the reflection of his surroundings; the great man is the one whose ideas reflect most exactly the objective conditions of action ... political acts are to be judged not only according to their meaning for the moral agent, but also according to the sense they acquire in the historical context and dialectical phase in which such acts originate.19

From here, I will focus on dialectical awareness as a mode of transcendent consciousness common to Marxists and mystics generally and this essay in particular.

The central point to be made is that dialectics begin with a sense of unity and interrelationship, the particular is only comprehended in terms of its relation to the whole. Understanding then follows realization that apparently separate or

contradictory things are actually simply different forms or aspects of the same thing. The point is to work with frames of mind which suggest relationships in various patterns - not to begin with the mind as a vacuum and gradually build knowledge by concentrating first on one empirically verifiable "fact", then differentiating it from others most like it through development of typologies, and finally to erect a pyramid of knowledge by taking each fact as a 'brick' and building from there. That is to erect a temple to Baal, it is the plague, it is to create graven images and then worship them. It is to profoundly confuse symbols and metaphors for the reality they merely express and never embody. It is a literalism which in sociological jargon is "reification" of abstractions. Escape from the blinders of everyday awareness has been an increasingly common focus of thought in contemporary America - the consequence has been spreading interest in writers such as Marcuse, Brown, and Watts and subjects such as Marxism, mysticism, and Zen. In his *Zen and the Birds of Appetite*, Thomas Merton concludes that

The point is that facts are not just plain facts. There is a dimension where the bottom drops out of the world of factuality and of the ordinary. Western industrial culture is in the curious position of having simultaneously reached the climax of an entire totalitarian rationality of organization and of complete absurdity and self-contradiction. Existentialists and a few others have noticed the absurdity. But the majority persist in seeing only the rational machinery against which no protest avails ... 20

Response to the extremity of repression and alienation, that is to the depth of confusion between the apparent and the really real is what Marcuse terms "negative" thought. In this sense, negation is not a nihilistic denial, but a transcendence leading toward higher affirmation.

To Marcuse, dialectical thinking is positive since it leads to a notion of universals which makes the particular comprehensible. 21 To Norman O Brown dialectics occur as the activity of consciousness struggling to "circumvent the limitations imposed by the formal-logical law of contradictions." In his view dialectical thought is common to psychoanalysis, mysticism, poetry, the philosophy of organism, Feuerbach, and Marx - "a miscellaneous assemblage; but, as Heraclitus said, the unseen harmony is stronger than the seen." 22 For Brown "dialectics rather than dualism is the metaphysic of hope rather than despair." 23 For Hegel "the truth is the whole. The

whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development" and "Being is continuous becoming." 24

Critical thought is negative in Marcuse's sense because "Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is unfree; that is to say, man and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist as 'other than they are'." 25 Then freedom and truth come only when man can break through his "reified world". 26 At the same time there is a dual process through which increasing separation between consciousness and the true self leads to intensified awareness. In Hegel's terms

abstraction from reality, which the formation of the notion requires, makes the notion not poorer but richer than reality, because it leads from the facts to their essential content. 27

And for Brown it appears that "Our deepest knowledge of ourselves is attained only on condition of the highest abstraction." 28 The history of man then is seen as the dual growth of alienation and emergence of mind. Resolution of the tension created by the split comes through comprehension of the distance between the particular and the universal - not through collection of infinite particulars. In Hegel's framework the particular individual appears as

incomplete mind, a concrete shape in whose existence, taken as a whole, one determinate characteristic predominates, while the others are found only in blurred outline." 29

Then perfect freedom requires "that the subject comprehend all objects, so that their independent objectivity is overcome." 30 The free individual is the one who understands, who experiences, the depths of his unfreedom and sees that he is only a focus or node within a total unity of being.

At base, the dialectical notion of negation is fairly simple. Money, for example, is real only in a very particular sense. It is not something having intrinsic value, rather it becomes "real" because human beings choose to act as though it has value, in other words it is a symbol. Brown has argued that



Measured by rational utility and real human needs, there is absolutely no difference between the gold and silver of modern economy and the shells or dogs' teeth of archaic economy. 31

To negate money is to realize precisely the sense in which it is a symbol rather than something transcendently real. Yet the tendency steaming from our situation is to assume that money is an inalterable fact of existence. The tendency is to forget that it is merely our creation and take it for granted that we have to function through money in order to exist. Once the reality of the symbol has been accepted, once the symbol has been reified, then it begins to control consciousness rather than the converse. The symbol is confused with the reality it refers to, the human beings responsible for the symbol to begin with are repressed by it. All symbols function this way.

Negation is the realization of the unreality of the form; but then affirmation comes in acceptance of the object's reality at a different level - as an expression but not embodiment of the really real. So money is real as a symbol, but not as something ultimate in any sense. The dialectical traditions of negative and mystical thought hold that a similar argument bears on all existence. It becomes clear that the ego, for instance, is no more real or permanent than a symbol. The self is not separate in the sense that we all like to think it is. From this vantage point, freedom is not the permission to remain in idiosyncratic and isolated delusion, but awareness of unity and the irrelevance of the individual ego.

In Marxist theory, dialectical materialism suggests analysis of society and history through focus on three basic structural levels: the techno-productive, the social, and the ideological. Change and process then result from contradictions between levels which create imbalance and tension. The point is that in reality there is never a perfect functional balance since changes in one level are not met with automatic and reflexive response at other levels - there is an inertia to structures. Hegel commented on the resistance to change at the ideological level.

The first instinctive reaction on the part of knowing, when offered something that was unfamiliar, is usually to resist it. It seeks by that means to save freedom and native insight, to secure its own inherent authority. 32

According to Marx, changes at the productive level have the most significance since subsistence is the major problem of life. In this sense the social and ideological levels are epiphenomenal, but he never implied that in any given situation a total analysis can rest on economics. That is a gross reductionism and inversion which obscures the Marxist contention that it is precisely the lack of reflexive functional response which accounts for the nature of change. It is always the interaction of all structures which determines the course of events.

Still, different structures perform different functions. Mao, using "cause" where I use "structure", distinguishes between external causes which are the condition of change and internal causes which are its basis. So

In a suitable temperature, an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis. 33

At the same time, structures are abstractions and really exist only in the mind - so warns Lévi-Strauss. 34 They are heuristic devices or tools designed to increase understanding of patterns of events, but exist only in continuous change and interaction and at most establish a set of probabilities. 35 Pursuit of this image results in a critical paradox. On the one hand there is the suggestion that structures are comprehended only in transformations, on the other the demand for clear delineation of structural parameters in order to clarify the stresses of interaction. The very act of description implies static exposition contrary to the search for flux and change. The point is that any reduction of reality to words or patterns is a perversion or parody - grasp of structure and process occurs only in the mind. Genuine insight then comes through understanding of drives underlying forms rather than with grasp of structural contours. Thus there is a double edge to the sword of analysis and escape from alienation comes through construction of transparent tools of thought, tools which really come to grips with themselves rather than merely with some "objective" reality "out there".

The implication is that normal academic notions of objectivity and neutrality are illusions. To a large extent the roots of contemporary established social thought follow patterns set in the natural sciences. Mystique has it that insight increases with extrication of the self from personal emotive involvement with the object of study. The ideal is clear separation between subjective "distortions" and "objective" conditions. In effect this is to argue that valid insights reflect mastery of surface

forms without a sense of the underlying forces those forms respond to. Theodore Roszak has commented on this in his analysis of the "counter culture" in the United States

Whatever the scientific method may or may not be, people think they are behaving scientifically whenever they create an In-Here within themselves which undertakes to know without an investment of the person in the act of knowing ... Under its auspices we subordinate nature to our command only by estranging ourselves from more and more of what we experience. 35

The attempt is diametrically opposed to the notion that there is a unity to existence and that meaning comes through relationship between forms. Hegel recognized the contradiction and foreshadowed Heisenberg's uncertainty principle

For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of absolute Reality, the suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to anything does not leave it as it is for itself, but rather entails in the process and has in view, a molding and alteration of it. 37

Hegel's view is not common to an academic community which holds that serious understanding of things like Marxism and mysticism is hampered rather than enhanced when those become serious emotive possibilities for the researcher.

In fact I think it should be clear that genuine understanding presupposes awareness of the sense in which those who are studied are precisely the same as those who do the studying. Without that awareness there is a lack of touch with the common human element, there is no sense in the researcher that those he is studying are humans like himself and dealing with essentially the same dilemmas in a different form and context. If that touch is missing, then it is beyond any doubt that the intervening structures are not understood, if the dichotomy between object and subject remains then understanding is a perversion.

Still, this is not to abdicate critical capacities. Those who study something from outside begin from a very different vantage point and cannot help but emerge with different conclusions. The point is only that it is essential to begin with the assumption that those who are being studied are engaged in the same struggle as those who are doing the studying. So again the point is to begin from an awareness

of unity rather than dichotomization. The task of scholarship is to explore and illuminate the nature of relationships between things rather than to build typologies by describing things and defining differences. That task of scholarship is to explore and illuminate the nature of relationship between things rather than to build typologies by describing things and defining differences. That task of description is an integral part of awareness of unity, but comprehension of dynamics and vision of the universal truths which all scholarship claims as a goal requires orientation toward unity.

One clear implication of all this is that the accepted academic separation between history and social science, between diachrony and synchrony, is both misleading and false. The thrust of dialectical imagination is toward simultaneous vision of structure and process. In stark contrast, a vast line of historians and social scientists have been cultivating world views without structure and order on the one hand and without time on the other. This must be one of the more blatant instances of reification of dichotomies through institutionalization in academic structure. Students are taught to believe that by choosing a discipline they are defining what they will study, not that they will be working at the same problems from a different vantage point. This "division of labor" suggests separability of the problems spoken to.

Of course none of this is to deny that excellent insights have been achieved, if it is a "negation" of the traditions it is meant as a dialectical negation which subsumes and does not deny past accomplishments. Rather this is to try to pinpoint a structural tendency of the existing academic arrangement and suggest that the inclination stemming from current situations is to view things as separate problems while in fact that separation denies the stated aims of each discipline and leads to false commitment to academic disciplines rather than to Truth.

So in this essay I have been far more concerned with the extension of my frame of mind, with the growth of my own real awareness, than with explicitly "academic" accomplishments. I am much less concerned with evaluation of some of the very fine work which has been done on modern Indonesia than with trying to place the best insights of that tradition in a more holistic framework. My theoretical interest lies at the most general level and I have tried to stick to that level in writing. The aim has been to articulate a framework challenging past insights in terms of approach more than by arguing the facts of development. As I see it, more strictly scholarly gains will follow from this kind of commitment than from dedication to the existing corpus

of academic work by fleshing out underdeveloped areas of primary research and through careful modification of accepted approaches to insight.

Rigorous pursuit of insight naturally results in borrowing from whatever is of value, but the commitment should never be to the existing structure itself - that would be a clear contradiction. If I offer an approach to understanding here, it is because I have found it enlightening in my own grappling with the basic conundrums of social theory - the point of organized expression is that it serves both to extend my own line of thought and to communicate those images to others. The judgment must be strictly pragmatic: does a particular image work to clarify. In this case it is quite clear to me that dialectical thought clarifies the nature of process in history and change in social structure - that is more than enough to justify effort and the remaining question is that of effectiveness of communication.

In fact, the human situation is very much out of joint; we act not so much according to the Real as in terms of distorted images of it. The distortion comes through consistent confusion between the images and the reality they refer to. So the religions of the world originated as efforts to translate visions of unity and harmony into social reality. Then they degenerated into confusion as the followers have taken literally the messages which began as poetry. We act through images of the Real which grow from experience of conditions which no longer remain. Because man is a social animal, his images of order and devices for survival depend on symbols which become perversion: of the thoughts they represent. The very tools which give us depth of feeling and complexity of experience act at the same time to create distances between the self and the universal. Our creations turn back to recreate us as parodies of the Spirit. Consciousness is captive of past experience of the individual and society - it is not tuned to its immediate situation.

In times of trouble, social structures crumble and normally adequate symbolic structures lose their coherence. People are jarred from their moorings in everyday awareness and discover the chaos and void lying beyond familiar cosmologies. It becomes the apocalypse as the world as it was known is lost. As experiential distance between the self and others grows, mind continues expanding to discover things other than itself. At the moment of greatest isolation there is also the most potential for intensity in reunion. Sanity and brilliance, touch with the natural order, then come through greatest awareness of the unreality of precisely the structures through

which it is manifest. It is the capacity to translate total insanity into language, the creative act of giving meaningful order to symbols.

In the United States the established reality is becoming intolerable to an increasing number of people. It is a millennial era in which our entire conception of cosmic order is suspect - at least it offers little direction and less comfort. Current conditions have been paralleled in microcosm where innumerable and isolated primitive worlds have shattered after Western intrusion. New conditions are more extreme due to the totality of organization and extent of interdependence in industrialized society. But as Norman O Brown puts it

Perhaps the time is now ripe when the mystic can break the glass through which he sees all things darkly and the rationalist can break the glass through which he sees all things clearly, and both together can enter the kingdom ... 38

In Indonesia the deterioration of social order resulted in extreme tensions, the florescence of millennial and Marxist movements, and ultimately the killing of masses. In America there is a similar deterioration of order and meaning. As always, the demand of the time is for transcendence, for vision which can break the barrier between the insanity of accepted reason and the incomprehensibility of mysticism. If there is a revolution to be made, it must be the revolution in which progress in history and the fulfillment of individual self-consciousness are united.

## NOTES

### UNITY IN DIVERSITY

1. Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, V XXVI N 2. Here he suggests the need for a re-evaluation of the PKI in the aftermath of the killings. Earlier articles by Hindley, McVey, and Feith provide fine analyses of the PKI prior to the coup. The thrust of their argument was that the PKI was becoming Indonesian faster than Indonesia was becoming communist. See Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: the Politics of Domestication", *American Political Science Review*, V 56 N 4. Ruth McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy" in Doak Barnett ed. *Communist Strategies in Asia*, New York and London, 1963. Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in Ruth McVey ed. *Indonesia*, New Haven, 1967.

In the years before the coup the PKI had developed a mass organization including well over two million party members in 1962 - with an additional 12.5 million in auxiliary organizations. See Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961, p vii.

2. The Sarekat Islam was a mass organization springing up in the second decade of the century. It was the first mass movement of Indonesian nationalism and declined in the early 1920s following a 1922 split within the party when the radical Semarang branch, along with perhaps one third of the local branches, left the party to create the PKI. see Robert Jay Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java, SEAP, Yale University, New Haven, 1963 p 17.

3. Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, CMIP, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 1957. p 84. Support for the PKI came mainly from the abangan population of East and Central Java although it had spread beyond that base by the 1960's.

4. Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", p 324.

5. Jan Pluvier, *Confrontations*, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, p 28.

6. The Darul Islam guerrillas were religious extremists who began agitating during the revolutionary struggle of the late 1940's and were in favor of establishing a theocratic Muslim state. The movement was led mainly by rural religious teachers and picked up steam during the late 1950's after a lull early in the decade. Centers of activity were in West Java and Northern Sulawesi.

7. John Legge, *Indonesia*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965, p 144.

8. Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966. This is by far the most useful summary of developments in the two ecosystems and the imbalance of Western impact on the archipelago.

9. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution", in C. Geertz ed. *Old Societies and New States*, New York and London, 1963

and John Legge, Indonesia, p 3.

10. On the "Great Debate" see Claire Holt, *Art in Indonesia*, Ithaca, 1967. Her chapter covering the modern arts deals with the way tension has been focused on and magnified through the lenses of art. The dilemma of the intellectual is finely stated in Sutan Sjahrir *Out of Exile*, New York, 1949.

11. Maurice Godelier, "System, Structure, and Contradiction in Capital, in *The Socialist Register 1967*, New York 1967. On page 92 he refers to Marx and Levi-Strauss's similar attitude to underlying structures.

12. This is the same argument Godelier makes on page 105 - that it is the total system which should "be subject to analysis since the course of events is a matter of interrelations rather than individual will". Ellul's argument is from Jacques Ellul *The Technological Society*, New York, 1964, p 391; quoted in Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture*, New York, 1969, p 231.

13. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities", *Australian Outlook*, v 21 N 3, p 274.

14. Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, CMIP, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 1957 gives an overview and summary of the results and the social roots of various parties.

15. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia, Problems and Opportunities", *Australian Outlook*, V21 N3, page 268-9 for a summary of the various parties. Daniel Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy*, CMIP, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 1966 p 9 comments that PKI success came from appeals to a peasantry largely ignored by the other parties.

16. Feith, "Dynamics", p 318 and Lev, *Transition....*, p 7

17. Feith, "Dynamics", p 323



18. Hans Schmitt, "Post Colonial Politics: A Suggested Interpretation of the Indonesian Experience", *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* V IX N 2. Feith has responded to criticism of his stance by David Levine in "History and Social Structure in the Study of Contemporary Indonesia", *Indonesia*, N 7. Feith's response came in a paper presented to the Conference of the Australian Political Studies Association in Sydney on August 28, 1969. "The Study of Indonesian: Politics: A Survey and an Apologia". While it is a fine summary of the real progress made in the field, it is not a substantive response to the critical issues raised by work such as Schmitt's and comments such as Levine's.

19. Geertz, *Involution*, p 48.

20. *Ibid.* pp 48, 80, 142. The Dutch wanted to keep the buying power of the Javanese peasantry down to prevent possible British and later Japanese interests from developing. Both of those powers stood to gain from any increase of market for cheap industrial goods and the Dutch did not. According to DH Berger in *Structural Changes in Javanese Society: the Village Sphere*. CMIP, Ithaca, NY 1957, pp 1. The Dutch governor General Bosch, in the early nineteenth century, wanted the Javanese to remain peasants with a subsistence orientation rather than to have them become "coolies".

21. Geertz, *Involution*, p 56. 60% of the coffee crop was grown by almost entirely Outer Island and indigenous small-holders while 95% of the sugar crop was grown by almost exclusively Dutch owned corporate plantations on Java.

22. *Ibid.* p 123.

23. Schmitt, "Post Colonial Politics", p 181 and support from Wilhelm Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, Bandung 1956, p 279. also Harry Benda, "Decolonization in Indonesia", *The American Historical Review*. V LXX N 4, p 1073 and Harry Benda and John Bastin, *A History of Modern Southeast Asia* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1968, p 157. Benda argues that decolonisation implied that the "Indonesian river is flowing more and more in an Indonesian bed" but that independence did not imply a decline of Western influence.

24. Schmitt, "Post Colonial Politics", p 132. This view ignores the possible interpretation that the nationalist movement should be seen as essentially the rise to power of one social sector, the one which in fact was gaining through its foreign connections and through inaction. He confuses nationalism with the general welfare at this point, but it is a rare exception in a perceptive essay.
25. Ibid. p 177 and p 180.
26. Both of the sentences here draw from Benjamin Higgins, *Indonesia: the Crisis of the Millstones*, Princeton, London, Toronto, New York, 1963, pp 10 and 74.
27. Douglas Paauw, "From Colonial to Guided Economy", in Ruth McVey ed. *Indonesia*, New Haven, 1967, p 166.
28. Ibid. p 174 and p 180.
29. Schmitt, "Post Colonial Politics" and Levine, "History and Social Structure" in contrast to Higgins, *Indonesia*, p 8 and Paauw, "From Colonial to Guided. Economy", p 156.
30. Geertz, *Involution*, pp 146-7.
31. Feith, "Dynamics...", p 322.
32. John Legge, *Indonesia* , pp 158-161.
33. Feith "Dynamics...", 11 325. Lev, "Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* V XXXVI N 4 P 353. Feith argues on page 337 that Sukarno had legitimacy and the army did not, but that he still needed the PKI mass base for leverage against the army.
34. Lev, *Transition...*, p 5 and Lev, "Political Role...", p 349.
35. Lev, *Transition...*, p 191 and Ruth McVey, "Communism and Transition...", p 177.

36. Legge, Indonesia, p 143. The divisions into regional sections remained until 1956.
37. Pluvier, Confrontations, pp 51-54. He comments that after the rebellions had been crushed the central command and central government treated the rebel leaders very leniently - indicating an empathy military leaders did not feel with leftist or religious recalcitrants.
38. McVey, "Communism and Transition", pp 159 and p 164 mentions that the PKI supported this effort of the army although it did not offer concrete assistance.
39. Ibid. p 167. She cites the army's heightened sense of efficiency following the suppression of the various rebellions.
40. Lev, "Political Role", pp 362-3 and Toenggoel Siagian's Operasi Karya, unpublished MA thesis, Cornell University, 1966.
41. McVey, "Communism and Transition", p 168.
42. Feith, "Dynamics", p 332.
43. George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca. 1952, pp 476-8. He states that "the preponderant majority (of the Republican leadership)...were dedicated to political principles and practices which were roughly the same as those aspired to in the Western democracies". It makes little difference whether you use Harry Benda's term "semi-Westernized intelligentsia" or Franz Fanon's label "national bourgeoisie" from The Wretched of the Earth, New York, 1968.
44. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution", I would quarrel with him only in that he focuses too narrowly on the cultural dimensions of diversity rather than placing heavier weight on institutional structures transmitting those forms.
45. Kahin Nationalism and Revolution, pp 478-80. My attention

was drawn by Feith's article cited above on "The Study of Indonesian Politics". Geertz says much the same in his essay on the "Javanese Kijaji the Changing Role of a Cultural Broker" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* V II, p 228. He argues that the connections between the two traditions were extremely brittle and that "One of the most serious problems facing' the post-revolutionary Indonesian political elite has turned out to be the maintenance of mutual understanding between themselves and the mass of the peasant population".

46. Eric Wolf, *Peasants*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966 and Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, Ithaca, NY 1953. The terms "Great" and "Lesser" traditions were coined by Redfield and have found a good deal of popularity among social historians like Benda and Kartodirdjo. The framework suggests an approach to peasantries through analysis of the structural links connecting them to the civilised and centralised tradition they relate to. Benda uses this approach in his essay on "The Structure of Southeast Asian History", *Journal of Southeast Asian History* V 3 N 1. My view of the PKI would place it into the train of earlier developments as he describes them. Wolf suggests that the essence of "peasantry" lies in the tenuous balance between subsistence needs and the demands of a greater tradition (p13). Further, he suggests that it is the essence of modernity and revolution to transform the function of the peasantry until they become producers for an expanding market economy (p12). He says that "revolutions aim, ultimately at the subjugation and transformation of peasantry into a new kind of social grouping" (p 109).

47. Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, New York, 1959, p 24. Wilhelm Wertheim in *Indonesian Society in Transition*, Bandung, 1956, p 269 argues that Indonesian movements were mystically and reactionarily inclined - fitting the thesis for this case. Harry Benda has argued in his essay on "Peasant movements in colonial Southeast Asia" *Asia Studies*, V III N 3 that agrarian movements are distinct from modern nationalism. In one sense I would agree with him, but I think it is more important to emphasize that the social drives underlying the variants of protest are essentially the same.

48. Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities", in Ruth McVey ed. Indonesia, New Haven, 1967, pp 25-48. Her summary is the basis of my presentation and includes all the specific facts mentioned.
49. Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, p 5.
50. Hildred Geertz, "Cultures and Communities", p 30.
51. Clifford Geertz, "Ritual and Social Change", American Anthropologist, 59: 1, p 36. The essay describes the impact of political parties on a funeral selamatan which is upset because factions unexpectedly prevent the normal functioning of the ritual.
52. Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Village", in GW Skinner ed. Ethnic and National loyalties in Village Indonesia, New Haven, 1959, p 37.
53. Geertz, "Ritual", p 37. The schism was probably exaggerated in the area of his team's fieldwork, but the image holds generally and is emphasized a great deal in the work of most of the "Modjokerto" team.
54. Clifford Geertz, Peddlars and Princes, Chicago, 1963 and "The Javanese Kijaji" in Comparative Studies in Society and History V II, p 230. In both of these he comments on the connection of modernistic Islam to emerging petty trade and village commerce. In the essay on rural kijaji he details the manner in which teaching at the rural religious schools, the pesantren, feed into this complex.
55. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia", p 263. Islam offered an ethic of individualism and egalitarianism which could rationalise a break from the constraints of local customs and family ties which limited opportunity to get ahead commercially.
56. Robert Jay, Religion and Politics pp 1-14.
57. Alice Dewey, "Trade and Social Control in Java", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, V 92, 1962 she details the role of Chinese traders in rural

Java. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, pp 184-5--he discusses the main directions of the leadership of SI. His conclusion was that the SI was "mainly concerned with the interests of the rising middle class". The SI concession to radical elements that foreign capitalism (but not indigenous capitalism) was evil was an attempted conciliation which obviously cost commercial interests little. Bernard Dahm in *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*, Ithaca, 1969 has disagreed with Wertheim on this point. He argues (pp 35-9) that the deeply Indonesian idea that "all things are one" was active early in the independence movement and that the leaders of the movement were actively concerned with unifying the movement to create a "state within a state" - based on support from all classes. (p 36). I have to agree with Baars, who wrote after the SI conference of 1916 that the leaders "really felt that they spoke for the whole people and saw a concession achieved as their victory. But this in no way alters what we are taught by our theory, that we are to look for the driving social forces hidden behind the thought, so that then it becomes clear" (Dahm, 1:35). Here again it is the effect of strategies rather than the intentions underlying them that is critical.

58. William Oates, "The Afdeeling B", *JSEAH*, V IX N I. Oates describe the senses in which the peasantry at the base of the SI saw things differently than the leadership - how peasants conceived of the movement in millenarian terms and were quite capable of formally accepting a program without feeling any responsibility to carry it out.

59. Robert Van Neil, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite The Hague and Bandung*, 1960. He describes the "red hadjis" active in the revolts of 1926 and 1927. My point is that from the strictly grass-roots perspective there is little reason for hostility to the PKI while there has been clear reason for antagonism from the leadership. Of course I am not arguing that that distaste did not filter down through alirans - it did. I am only trying to explain its beginnings.

60. Jay, *Religion and Politics...* , p 103.

61. Hindley, *Communist Party*, pp 11-12.

62. Feith, *Indonesian Elections*, p 84.

63. Hindley, *Communist Party*, p 3

## NOTES: THE NAIL OF GOD

1. Clifford Geertz, *The Development of the Javanese Economy*, MIT mimeo, 1957. The whole essay is a coherent introduction to Javanese social history. My main sources have been Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, New Haven, 1963, pp 134 and DH Berger, *Structural Changes in Javanese Society: the Village Sphere*, Ithaca, 1957, pp 1-20. Berger comments (p 14) that the aristocratic style was more deeply rooted than it had been in Europe. He uses the term "feudal" throughout. The history should be seen in terms of gradual shifts of focus for civilisation, not in terms of long conflicts between separate established centers of power. So the Pasisir emerged gradually as its regents broke away from declining Madjapahit and then the converse came as the hinterland of Demak became the inland based empire of Mataram. Berger comments that it was the isolation of the kratons which accounts for the extreme refinement, the cultural involution (p 12).
2. Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java*, Ithaca, 1968, p 18. Robert Heine-Geldern, *Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia*, Ithaca, p 1.
3. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities", *Australian Outlook*, V 21 N 3, p 266.
4. van der Kroef, Justus M, "Javanese Messianic Expectations", *CSSH*, V I, p 304 cites "the nail of the universe" as a title for the Sultan of Surakarta. Similar reference in Heine-Geldern, *Conceptions*, p 6. Van der Kroef also mentions the conception of the king as Vishnu, as does Heine-Geldern. Moertono, *State and Statecraft*, mentions the king as lingam as does Heine-Geldern p 10; and Ben Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture", Ithaca, mimeo, 1969, p 21. Moertono states (p 45) that the source of the king's power is thought to be mystical.
5. Anderson, "Power", p 5 and Berger, *Structural Changes*, p 4 both suggest that the Javanese notion of power was personal rather than being based on wealth.
6. van der Kroef, "Messianic expectations", p 303.
7. Moertono, *State and Statecraft*, p 20.

8. Soedjatmoko, "Problems and Opportunities", p 267
9. Anderson, "Power", p 57 and Claire Holt, *Art in Indonesia*, Ithaca, 1967, pp 84 and 149. Holt states that there is no hint of rationality in the ancient arts, that the whole mood is mystical and magical (p 122).
10. van der Kroef, "Messianic Expectations" p 301.
11. Ibid. p 299.
12. Moertono, *State and Statecraft*, p 74. The doctrines of the Bhagavad Gita bear very closely on this. For instance, "All actions take place in time by the interweaving of the forces of Nature; but the man, lost in selfish delusion, thinks that he himself is the actor." (p 58) Other sections come to mind in comparing Javanese to Indian thought: "The soul that moves in the world of senses and yet keeps the senses in harmony, free from attraction and aversion, finds rest in quietness." (p 54) "But beyond my visible nature is my invisible Spirit. This is the fountain of life whereby this universe has its being."(p 74) I "When a man sees that the infinity of various beings is abiding in the One, and is an evolution from the one, then he becomes one with Brahman."(p 102).
13. Moertono, *State and Statecraft*, p 15.
14. van der Kroef, "Messianic Expectations", p 302.
15. Clifford Geertz, "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example", *American Anthropologist*, 59:1, p 40.
16. Holt, *Art in Indonesia*, p 28. Holt argues that art served as the strongest link between peasants and kraton. Clifford Geertz, *Religion of Java*, London, 1960, p 268 mentions the holding of wajang performances in selametans in the villages.
17. Benedict Anderson, *On the Mythology and Tolerance of the Javanese*. CMIP, Ithaca, 1965, p 5



18. Benedict Anderson, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics", Indonesia, 1966, p 94 and James Peacock, Rites of Modernization, Chicago, 1968, p 125. Peacock speaks of shifts in theme within the ludruk, a popular modern form of drama; main concentration shifted in recent times from the tension between alus and kasar to that between madju and kuna, modern and progressive versus traditional Anderson cites changing preference within the wajang for figures such as Kumbakarno, with his "my country right or wrong" frame of mind, and away from alus heroes like Ardjuna.
19. Berger, Structural Changes, p 4. He describes the "art of living" focus among the prijaji.
20. Anderson, "Power", pp 24-25
21. van der Kroef, "Messianic Expectations", p 307. Kali being the god of destruction, the inverse of Vishnu, the life principle.
22. Ibid. pp 307-309. Perhaps there is something in this like Hegel's world historic individual - embodying and in the same breath transcending the age.
23. Ibid. p 316
24. Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed, New Haven, 1968, p 83. He mentions Feith's position and takes his own. I do not think this orientation of Sukarno's limited his appeal as it seems to account for his mass base.
25. Ibid. p 85.
26. Soedjatmoko, "Problems and Opportunities", pp 266-267
27. Geertz, Islam Observed, p 86. Lubis makes a similar point in his essay on "Mysticism in Indonesian Politics", in Robert Tillman ed, Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia, New York, 1969, p 179. He says that the "Sukarno regime was the ideal model of a situation in which it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain where the political leader ends and the dukun begins."
28. Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian

Independence, Ithaca, 1969. p 23 cites Sukarno's immersion in the wayang as a boy. The quote is from pp 26-7.

29. Ibid. The whole book is the major source for these comments.

30. Weatherbee, Donald, Ideology in Indonesia, New Haven, 1966, p 45 and the whole book for a general overview of the ideology of Guided Democracy. Sukarno specifies liberalism as the major enemy in his important speech, Marhaen and Proletariat, CMIP, Ithaca, 1960.

31. Koentjaraningrat, Social Anthropological Observations on Gotong-rojong Practices in Two Villages of Central Java. CMIP, Ithaca, 1961 and Selo Soemardjan, The Dynamics of Community Development in Rural Central and West Java, CMIP, Ithaca, 1963.

32. Selo Soemardjan, Community Development, pp 5, 7, 8.

33. Geertz, "Ritual and Social Change", p 46.

34. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Indonesia 1961, Djakarta, 1961. reference to Sanskrit law, p 133; that to Sukarno drawing on latent thoughts of the people on pp 38 and 41; and that to symbiosis on p 44.

35. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, Ithaca, 1966, p 10.

36. Anderson, "Languages of Politics", p 112. Perhaps the process he is describing is similar to processes everywhere as elites become entrenched and gradually grow to use the slogans through which they reached the people as a defense against them. But probably the point can be emphasized more for Indonesia. As he describes it more fully... "This fission within some of the most important emotive words of the Indonesian language reflects both sociological and metaphysical characteristics of post-revolutionary Indonesia. It represents the re-stratification of contemporary Indonesian society, and the metaphysical determination to maintain the aspirations and idealism of Indonesia in a changing social context by a traditional process of (so to speak) 'dualization' and disassociation... Sociologically it is manifest in the growing stratification of Indonesian society, the increasing isolation of the elite from

the masses, and the development of parasitic bureaucratic structures in all fields of social activity. Politically the slow narrowing of the government's political base, the increasing conservatism of its policies, and the ever more frantic effort to protect its own vested interests reflects the same condition" (pp 106-7 and 109).

37. Bernard Dahm, "Sukarno and History", in Tillman ed, *Man, State and Society*, p 409. He mentions that the image of "ashes and fire" came from Juarez. Then in *Sukarno and the Struggle* 'Dahm points out that Sukarno always distinguished between the true thought of originators and the actions of historical agents (p 71). On p 65 he states that Sukarno saw the three elements of Nasakom as having: essentially the same goal. Finally, on p 74 that as far as Sukarno was concerned "Not only the tactics but also the theory of Marxism had changed. Marx and Engels were not prophets who had laid down guiding principles valid for all time; even their teachings had been outdated with passage of years." In this I think Dahm ignores the dialectical component in the teachings of Marx and Engels - if taken seriously, the implication was from the beginning that ideas have meaning only in their context and that thus seemingly fundamental tenets of Marxism are subject to change, but the underlying- framework might remain consistent.

38. Department of Foreign Affairs, *Indonesia 1961*, p 36

39. *Sukarno, Marhaen and Proletarian*, p 18

40. *Ibid.* p 28. Sukarno stated that he would be nothing apart from his roots in the people and Dahm in *Sukarno and the Struggle...* p 123 argued that in fact Sukarno was very closely in tune with the masses.

41. Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle...* pp 188 and 192. He is quoting Sukarno in this. Weatherbee, *Ideology in Indonesia*. p 20 comments on the dynamic and dialectical aspects of Sukarno's thought.

42. Dahm, "Sukarno and History", p 411.

43. Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle...*, 1969. He refers to Sukarno's distaste for the West and lack of analytical thought, that he lived in a world of fluid boundaries between things and that an either - or situation only emerged with the arrival of the West (pp 26, 67, 341). Then that he was always against parties (p 300) and favored a

one party system (p 320). Sukarno's distaste for liberalism comes through as well in his own speech Marhaen and Proletarian, pp 12, 22.

44. Harry Benda, "Reflections on Asian Communism", *The Yale Review*, V LVI N 1, p 13.

45. Anderson, "Languages of Politics", p 102.

46. Soedjatmoko, "Problems and Opportunities", p 288.

47. Frederick Engels *The Origin of the Family Private Property and the State*, in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, New York, 1968. pp 592-593.

48. Lubis, "Mysticism in Indonesian Politics", pp 182-183.

49. Norman O Brown, *Love's Body*, New York, 1966, p 133.

50. *Ibid.* pp 129 and 131.

51. Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle*, p xii.

52. Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists", *The American Political Science Review* V 56 N 4. pp 915-916.

53. *Ibid.* p 916.

54. Ruth McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy", in Doak Barnett ed, *Communist Strategies in Asia*, New York and London, 1963, pp 151-152.

#### NOTES -THE MASS LINE

1. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, Boston, 1966, p 116

2. *Ibid.* p 23.

3. *Ibid.* p 155.

4. Ibid. p 298.
5. George Lichtheim, *Marxism*, New York and Washington, 1967, p 128.
6. Ibid. p 77 and Justus M van der Kroef, "Indonesia: Lenin, Mao, and Aidit", in Walter Lacquer and Leopold Labedz eds, *Polycentrism*, New York, 1962, p 209 he mentions that Marx acknowledged the revolutionary potential of peasants, but stressed their conservative orientation. On p 210 he mentions that to Lenin it seemed that the peasant component was democratic, but not socialist.
7. Ibid. p 344.
8. Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, 1967 p 24
9. Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, Cambridge, Mass, 1968, p 237.
10. Ibid. p 240. The initial demands of the communists seem liberal in character as the aim was first to redistribute land into more equal small holding for the peasantry. The aim was to consolidate into cooperatives only after the completion of the revolution. See Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of the People's War*, Peking, 1965, p 23. van der Kroef in "Indonesia" in *Polycentrism* says the same thing on p 210.
11. Schram, *Political Thought of Mao*, p 43.
12. Mao Tse-tung, *Quotations*, pp 123-124.
13. Adam Schesh. *The Organizing Tactics of the Vietnamese Communist Party before World War Two*, unpublished MA thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967, pp 59-100. For details and a sense of what cadre organizing has been like in China, two books are particularly helpful. From them, one could argue that there was considerable cadre and Party response to particular local needs - at least in some areas of China. see Jan Hyrdal, *Report from a Chinese Village*, New York, 1965 and William Hinton, *Fanshen*, New York, 1968.

15. Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964, p 94.

16. *Ibid.* pp 71 and 77.

17. *Ibid.* p 23 reports the trip. Aidit and Lukman were 26 and 24 years old at the time (p 31). Neither Russia nor China paid any attention to the PKI between Madiun and the election victories of 1955. Ruth McVey mentioned that Aidit explained that during the trip they had been largely ignored by their fellow communists since neither was important at the time and their Party had just been decimated (interview, August, 1969).

18. van der Kroef, "Indonesia" in *Polycentrism*, p 217 stresses the independence of the PKI. p 212 he mentions Aidit's distinction between "patriotic" and "imperialist" landlords as it coincides with Mao's thought.

19. *Ibid.* p 215 from Aidit, *Pilihan Tulisan*, V I, p 249. This is parallel to Mao's line that "If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; If unity is sought through yielding, it will perish". in Lin Piao, *People's War*, p 19.

20. Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication", *American Political Science Review* V 56 N 4, p 920.

21. Hindley, *Communist Party*, p 22.

22. *Ibid.* p 25.

23. see Hindley, "Sukarno and the Communists" and Ruth McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy" in Doak Barnett ed. *Communist Strategies in Asia*. New York and London, 1963.

24. Hindley, *Communist Party*, pp 33-34. Western analysts almost universally contest the contention that there was large scale concentration of land under monopolistic landlords. As comes through later in the essay in my discussion of

this point, Aidit's defense was through argument that it was precisely the small scale of landlordism which made it particularly vicious. Also, foreign "ownership" might better have meant "control". The terminology here is Aidit's.

25. Dipa Nusantara Aidit, *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, Djakarta, 1963. in "Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution", 1957, a manual for training of cadres in the PKI schools, p 50. The same position is paralleled in Lin's *People's War*.

26. Aidit, "The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia", General Report to the 5th National Congress, March 1954. Hindley, *Communist Party*, p 41, quotes from Aidit. Also in *Aidit's Problems*, "The Birth and Growth of the CPI", p 63 he cites an argument that the history of the PKI is the history of workers leading the peasants. Hindley, p 160 argues that the real turning point in the Party position on the peasantry came with Aidit's 1953 article on the subject.

27. Aidit, *Problems*, "The Birth and Growth of the CPI", speech on the 35th anniversary of the PKI, *Hey* 23, 1955, p 64 he periodises PKI history. On pp 70-71 he mentions that the 1926 revolts had done something to raise political consciousness and challenge the Dutch. On p 89 he gives his analysis of the Madiun fiasco. In "Lessons from the History of the CPI", p 150 he suggests that the primary weakness of the PKI at Madiun was the absence of a peasant Base.

28. *Ibid*, both speeches, pp 96-97 and pp 154-157.

29. Aidit, *Problems*, "The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia", 1954, "Lessons From the History of the GPI", p 154 he argues necessarily heavy emphasis on attention to local circumstances in the formulation of a program. Also in his speech on "Lenin and Indonesia", 1960, p 182, he stresses the self-determination of the Party. Hutapea wrote a fine essay on this question of the marriage of theory and practice and dangers of various sorts of deviations - "Raise High the Banners of Party Development in the Field of Ideology", *Bintang Merah V XVI* (US-JPRS, *Activities of the PKI*, 1961).

30. Aidit, *Problems*, "Lenin and Indonesia", p 173 and Aidit's

Marxism dan Pembinaan Nasion Indonesia, Djakarta, 1964, pp 13 and 15. The statement here is originally Stalin's.

31. Aidit, "With the Spirit of the Banteng, Consolidate a Great Communist Organisation", Harian Rakjat July 6, 1964 ( JPRS 59).

32. Aidit, Marxism dan Pembinaan, p 50.

33. Aidit, Problems, "Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution " (p 12) and Njoto, "With Dialectical and Historical Materialism as the Weapons, Win Victory for the Indonesian Revolution", Review of Indonesia, V VIII N 8-10, p 26. As Njoto saw it, this indigenous layer of dialectical thought , had been repressed by later Hindu and Islamic ideas.

34. Aidit, Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat, Peking, 1964, p 143 - art must be revolutionary. Also his articles in Bintang Merah written after a conference on art and literature. V 20 Sept-Oct 1964. There he calls for the integration of arts with the people and the ridding of feudal residuals so that art can become a means of making the revolution (p34). On p 16 he argues that folklore should he used as a way of reaching and educating the people. That art is never neutral even in claiming to be, that it always is subject to influence by larger social forces, and that it therefore ought to be explicitly recognised as a political phenomenon.

35. Aidit, Problems, "For Democracy and a Gotong-Rojong Cabinet", p 418 and a parallel in Schesh, Organizing Tactics, p 53.

36. Aidit, Problems, pp 402-435 and from Sudisman, "Consolidate the Militancy and Efficiency of the Party Organization", Harian Rakjat, July 9, 1964 (JPRS 59) the whole essay.

37. Aidit, "Indonesia's Present Economic System and the Solution of the Economic Question", Harian Rakjat, July 10-11, 1964 (JPRS 60) pp 2-3.

38. Aidit, Problems, "The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia", General Report to the 5th National Congress of the PKI, March 1954, p 244.



39. Aidit, Problems, "Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution", pp 33-50. According to him (p 33), the Indonesian bourgeoisie has been weak and can therefore ally with the PKI for the achievement of some ends without jeopardizing overall Party strategy. This might well have been his line due to the pressures of political circumstance rather than from his analysis itself. The problem during the national revolution was (p 34) that "the basic forces in the Indonesian revolution... were not sufficiently aroused and drawn into the revolution."

40. The Board of Directors of the BTI issued an argument against reliance on foreign aid in *Harian Rakjat* Jan 7, 1964 (JPRS 52) p 6. Aidit argues for the strengthening of the government sector of the economy in "On the Mobilizing of Funds and Forces for Development" in *Harian Rakjat*, Jan 10, 1964 (JPRS 53) pp 2 and 4 and for land reform as an essential for development on p 7. In Aidit's *Banteng Spirit* pp 57-59 there is a list of PKI developmental aims: increasing the productive priority to workers and business, to have importing controlled so that it stops inhibiting the productive sectors, for the government to control exports, to cut back on interest rates and prices, for economic leadership to the state sector, for coordination of import - export distribution, for a realistic state Budget, for economic confrontation of Malaysia, and for more direct relationships with peoples Indonesia trades with.

41. Aidit, *Marxism dan Pembinaan*, pp 35 and 38 Nasakom and the Pantjasila are put forth as the keys to the united front. Also in Aidit "Back to the 1945 Constitution for a Change in Policies and Living conditions", *Review of Indonesia*, Supplement to numbers 9-10 (Sept-Oct 1959) Political Report to the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PKI, p 3 there is stated complete support for Guided Democracy, p 7 he pushes the idea of a gotong-rojong cabinet, and on p 10 he favors the drive to take Irian Barat from the Dutch. Sakirman made an important statement on the whole question in "What Does PKI Support for the 1945 Constitution and Guided Democracy Mean", *Bintang Merah*, V XVI, 1960 (JPRS, Activities of the PKI, 1961).

42. Aidit in *Harian Rakjat*, February 3, 1964 (JPRS 54) p 32.

43. Aidit, *Marxism dan Pembinaan*, p 35.

44. There is an extended critique in Aidit's "Indonesia's Present Economic system and the Solution of the Economic Question",

Harian Rakjat, July 10-11, 1964. On pp 21-22 there is an elaborated critique of Sumitro for divorcing the concept of poverty from those of feudalism and imperialism. Sumitro, according to this discussion, expected solution to the economic ills of the nation through "Puritanical self-denial" on the part of the masses rather than through planning at the top for the interests of the whole.

45. Sakirman, "PKI Support for Guided Democracy", p 10 and Aidit, "Toward Perfection of the Constitution of 1945" in Review of Indonesia, V IV, July 1957, p 39.

46. From an interview with Aidit in Harian Rakjat, August 20, 1964 (JPRS 64) pp 1-8. On page 1 he affirms the Pantjasila as a base of action, on p 2 he comments on religion, and on p 5 he refuses to comment on the differences between Murba and PKI out of interest in unity.

47. Aidit, "On the International Communist Movement and the Indonesian Revolution" (speech given at Peking, Djakarta, and Pyongyang), Review of Indonesia, supplement to numbers 2-4, 1963. p 8 reasserts necessity of legal Party and the list of major contradictions is on p 23.

48. Hindley, Communist Party, p 163

49. Seloemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta, Ithaca, 1962, pp 184-185. The period he is dealing with is that around the time of the national elections, the area is the special district around Jogja - neither could be stretched to include all of Java through the whole period I am dealing with, but grass-roots perspective: on the PKI are extremely hard to come by and this is useful as a suggestion of the Party's general mode of operation.

50. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, London 1960, p 171 for the comments on both the NU and Masjumi.

51. Hindley, Communist Party, p 160. Also Bintang Merah V 7 N 16, p 1 for the comment on Musso. His class analysis differed very little from the general PKI line later on - perhaps evidence of dogmatism on the part of the PKI rather than real response to the peculiarities of the situation.

52. Alimin, "Orang Tani dan Proletariat Desa di Indonesia",  
Suara Tani V 5 N 8/9, pp 13 and 14. A very full listing of demands which were later  
to become standard comes in the 5th anniversary meeting of the BTI in 1950. Suara  
Tani . V 5, N 8/9 (Nov 1950) pp 8-11. The list included: lower land rents, takeover of  
foreign estates, distribution of excess government lands, rural loan banks,  
supervision of water resources, cheap rural credits, improved villages, improved  
rural health services, improved teaching in village schools .
53. Sakirman, "Peranan Tani Dalam Revolusi Nasional", Suara Tani, V 5 N 8/9 pp  
35-40.
54. Aidit, Problems, p 252.
55. Speech of the General Secretary of the CC of the PKI, "Toward Perfection of the  
Constitution of the 1945 Proclamation Republic". Review of Indonesia, V IV 1951 July  
1957, p 35.
56. Aidit, "Change the Balance of Forces for the 100% Implementation of the  
President Sukarno Concept", Review of Indonesia, V IV, July 1957, p 16.
57. "Peasant's Union Holds National Congress", Review of Indonesia, V IV N 10-11  
(Oct-Nov 1957) pp 30-32. The Fifth National Congress of the BTI was held in  
Surakarta - both Sukarno and Aidit attended.
58. Njoto, Tentang Program PKI, Djakarta, 1959, list of demands on p 57, comments  
on feudalism and imperialism on p 46, and on rural conditions on p 40.
59. Hutapea, "Some Lessons From the First National Peasant 's Conference of the  
PKI" Review of Indonesia, V VI N 8, August 1959), pp 30-34.
60. "Survivals of Feudalism Still Oppressing the Peasants in Java", Review of  
Indonesia, V VI (January 1959), p 38.
61. Ibid. p 38

62. Njoto, "Opening Speech, CPI National Peasant's Conference", Review of Indonesia, supplement to V VI N 6 (June-July 1959) p 4.
63. Aidit, Banteng Spirit, pp 122-123.
64. Ibid. p 86 and on p 126 that the peasants were the basic force of the revolution and on p 124 that the revolution had. to Be essentially an agrarian revolution.
65. Ibid. p 130 and Aidit, Kaum Tani Mengganjang Setan Setan Desa, Djakarta, 1964, p 12 he gives the same list of reasons why peasants contribute to the revolution and explains that the list is a result of experience during the 1945 revolution. The list is the same as the one Lin Piao gives in People's War, p 10 which might suggest borrowing despite Aidi' s statement of origin. Since Aidit elsewhere consistently minimized the possibilities of armed conflict, this list doesn't conform too well to the general outlines of his analysis.
66. Ibid. pp 133-4.
67. Ibid. pp 144-6.
68. Aidit, Asmu, Mau, and Lenin. Untuk Bekerdja Lebih Baik Dikalangan Kaum Tani, Djakarta, 1964, pp 6-26.
69. "Aidit Discusses Study Made of the Situation of the Peasantry in Java" or "Main Conclusions Gained. from Research into Agrarian Relations in Java", Harian Rakjat, August 1, 1964 (JPRS 61) pp 16-18.
70. Ibid. p 20 and education on p 24.
71. Ibid. p 27
72. Ibid. pp 22-23 and Aidit, Tani Mengganjang... , p 18 for all of the above.
73. "Aidit Completes Research into the Conditions of the Peasants and Peasants Movement", Review of Indonesia V VIII N 5-7 pp 27-28.
74. Aidit, Tani Mengganjang..., pp 21-22. The reference covers the following' sentence as well.

75. Aidit, "Main Conclusions" (.TPRS 61), p 29. reference also for following sentence.

76. Aidit, *Tani Mengganjang...* , p 33 in reference to squatters and p 37 for that to productive forces.

77. Ibid. p 82.

78. Ibid. p 83 for reference to the spirit of 1945 Aidit, "Completes Research", *Review of Indonesia*, V VIII N 5-7, p 30 for reference to folklore as aid in propaganda.

79. Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes*, Chicago and London, 1963 and Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, New Haven, 1963, p 76. Not that these are in conflict, they aren't, but the implications do differ.

80. Clifford Geertz, *The Social History of an Indonesian Town*, Cambridge, Mass, 1965 for reference to the election and Geertz, "The Javanese Village", in Skinner ed, *Local, Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia*, New Haven, 1959 for the statement on Javanese village institutions being essentially national institutions.

81. William Oates, "The Afdeeling B: An Indonesian Case Study", *JSEAH*, V IX N 1, p 111.

82. Selosoemardjan, *Social Changes*, pp 181-185.

83. Ibid. p 394.

84. Hindley, *Communist Party*, p 65.

85. Lin Piao, *People's War*, p 19.

86. Sardjono, "Kader Organisasi Tani", *Suara Tani*, V V N 3;  
"On the Question of Developing Work Among the Peasants",  
*Review of Indonesia*, V IV N 8; Aidit, "Building the Organization is Important, but Building Ideology is even more important", *Review of Indonesia*, supplement to numbers 6-7, 1959; "Campaign Against Self-Satisfaction", *Harian Rakjat*, August 10, 1964 (JPRS 61); Aidit, "Be a Good and Still Better Communist", *Review of Indonesia*,

V VIII N 5-7; and finally in Aidit's *Sendjata Ditangan Rakjat*, Djakarta, 1958, he mentions that the major weakness of the *Harian Rakjat*, the main Party paper, was the lack of creative and constructive criticism from below (p 9).

87. Justus van der Kroef, "Land Tenure and Social Structure in Rural Java", *Rural Sociology*, V 25 N 4, pp 414-420.

88. Ibid. p 421.

89. Justus van der Kroef, "Peasants and Land reform in Indonesian Communism", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, V 4 N 1, p 45. Guy Pauker argues that the expansion into unused lands stopped only ten years ago. in *Political Consequences of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia*, Rand Corporation, P 3864, p 4. It doesn't much matter which and neither could be defended with any precision anyway. The point is that the limit had certainly been reached in the fifties and it was downhill from there.

90. Pauker, *Consequences*, p 25.

91. Kroef, "Land Tenure and Social Structure", p 424.

92. Kroef, "Peasants and Land Reform", p 34.

93. Kroef, "Land Tenure and Social Structure", p 427.

94. Kroef, "Peasants and Land Reform", p 38.

95. Ibid. pp 33, 35, 53.

96. Kroef, "Land Tenure and Social Structure", p 430.

97. Ibid. pp 427-428'

98. Kroef, "Peasants and Land Reform", p 54.

99. Ismael Ajemi, *Land Reform: A Sociological Interpretation*, unpublished. PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1964, pp 123-128.

100. Seloemardjan, *Social Changes*, p 26.

101. *Ibid.* p 26.

102. Pauker, *Consequences*, pp 13-14

103. *Ibid.* p 7. The government recognized the problem in its own journal which reported on the progress of the agrarian law. The minister of Agriculture, Sadjarwo, reported in *Penjuluh Landreform*, V IV N 4-7 (April-June 1965) p 9 that many of the officials delegated to carry out the program were themselves landowners and that this was one explanation for lack of success.

104. The comments on the passing of the law came in *Review of Indonesia*, V IV N 9-10, p 21. The PKI also came out with a journal specifically directed toward the landreform, *Pembangunan Desa*. It was published by the directors of the BTI, but for the most part was filled with reports on land reform, on local gotong-rojong activities, on new techniques, and so on. It was a very toned down journal and not at all aggressively Marxist in cast.

105. *Djawa Pos*, November 18, 1961 (Surabaja Press Summary)

106. *Djawa Pos*, Nov 18, 1961 (SPS)

107. *Trompet Masyarakat*, June 5-7, 1962 (SPS)

108. *Trompet Masyarakat*, July 20, 1962 (SPS)

109. *Djawa Timur*, August 6, 1962 (SPS) and *Suara Rakyat*, May 27, reported raising of the sentence after the appeal.

110. *Surabaja Pos*, November, 1961 (SPS).

111. Justus van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Revolutionary Gymnastics", *Asian Survey*, 7 V II 5, p 221.

112. Review of Indonesia, V VIII N 3-4, pp 2 and 6.
113. Djawa Timur, December 26, 1964 reports farmers manhandled by urban hirelings in Sumpit village on December 16th.
114. Djalan Rakjat Triweekly December 25 1964. (SPS) reporting on the incident of December 18th.
115. Trompet Masjarakat, November 26, 1964, p 5 (SPS).
116. Trompet Masjarakat, December 7, 1964, p 6. (SPS).
117. Mingguan Djalan Rakjat, March 24, 1964 (SPS).
118. Trompet Masjarakat July 29, 1964 (SPS).
119. Harian Umum, January 25, 1964 (SPS)
120. Obor Revolusi, January 22, 1964 and in Suara Rakjat February 1964 the army commander of East Java warned communists to negotiate peaceably rather than confront over the land issue. (SPS)
121. Harian Umum, September 26, 1964 (SPS).
122. Trompet Masjarakat, August 15, 1964 (SPS).
123. Obor Revolusi, February 11, 1964 (SPS).
124. Obor Revolusi, February 12, 1964 (SPS).
125. Obor Revolusi, February 17, 1964 (SPS).
126. Obor Revolusi, January 2, 1965 (SPS).
127. Djalan Rakjat Triweekly, February 11, 1965 (SPS).
128. Indonesian Weekly, February 14, 1965 (SPS).



129. *Obor Revolusi* February 15, 1965 and *Trompet Masyarakat*, February 16, 1965 (SPS).
130. *Obor Revolusi*, May 8, 1965 (SPS).
131. *Obor Revolusi*, June 24, 1964 (SPS).
132. *Suara Indonesia*, November 2, 1962 (SPS).
133. *Trompet Masyarakat*, May 21, 1963 (SPS).
134. *Trompet Masyarakat*, January 5, 1965 and *Dinamika*, January 11, 1965 (SPS).
135. Aidit, "Political Report" to the 4th Plenum of the CC of the PKI, May 11, 1965, *Harian Rakyat*, May 12, 1965 (JPRS 90) p 25 for reference to unnecessary generation of the conflict and p 59 for cadres following subjective desires.
136. *Ibid.* p 74 for statement that the front should include all people and p 33 for statement that the base of the Party needed to be expanded.
137. Michael Langenberg. "A Brief View of the September 30th Movement and the Army", *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, V 1 N 2, p 8.
138. Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia", *The Journal of Asian Studies* V XXVI N 2, p 244.
139. *Ibid.* p 245.
140. *Ibid.* p 245-6.
141. Wilhelm Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup", *Pacific Affairs*, V XXXIX N 1-2, p 123.
143. "Communist Movement Faces Urgent Tasks", *Horizont*, N 24, June 1969.
144. *The Catastrophe in Indonesia*, New York, 1966, pp 4 and 6.

145. Ibid. pp 13 and 15.

146. Ibid. pp 20 and 22.

147. Ibid. p 32.

148. Indonesian Tribune, p 29.

149. Ibid. p 30.

150. Ibid. p 34.

151. Rex Mortimer, "Indonesia: Emigre Post-Mortems on the PKI", Australian Outlook, V 22 N 3, p 353.

152. Wertheim, "Untung Coup", p 120.

153. Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, New York, 1968, p 116.

154 Ibid. pp 135-136.

#### NOTES - ALL THINGS ARE ONE

1. Ben Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture", mimeo 1969. p 13 .

2. Ibid. p 53.

3. Ibid. pp 57-60.

4. Ben Anderson, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics", Indonesia, N I 1966, pp 111-112. He goes on to say on p 114 that Sukarno is better understood in terms of Ratu Adil than Marx and that tension were along aliran lines rather than class.

5. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities", Australian Outlook, V 21 N 3 p 268. Soedjatmoko's conclusion is diametrically opposed to that of Hobsbawm cited in the first chapter. Hobsbawm argued that peasant revolts were basically

conservative in that they only reacted against excesses within an accepted framework and Soedjatmoko the contrary, that peasant movements are basically revolutionary. The difference is not important to my argument here as my concern when citing Hobsbawm was only to establish that these peasant movements do lend themselves to modern aims.

6. Willard Hanna, "The Rise and Fall of Mbah Suro", American Universities Field Service, Southeast Asia Series, V XV N 7 and David Mitchell, "Communism, Mystics, and Sukarnoism", Dissent 1968 are the sources for all of this material on the Mbah Suro movement.

7. Justus van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, Vancouver, 1965, p 303.

8. Ibid. p 304 and Guy Pauker, "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia", *Asian Survey* V 1 N 3 (1961) whole article. Soedjatmoko, "Problems and Opportunities", p 276 agreed that the PKI had captured the main symbols of revolution due to Sukarno's policies. He felt that the PKI had had the initiative under Guided Democracy.

9. Jan Pluvier, *Confrontations*, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, p 84.

10. Ben Anderson, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics", *Indonesia* N 1 1966, p 116.

11. Ben Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture", mimeo, 1969, p 28. and Mitchell, "Communism, Mystics, and Sukarnoism", p 31 argues that "In Sukarno's Indonesia... Sukarno was the final arbiter of what was indoctrinated, and what was censored, not the PKI."

12. Mochtar Lubis, "Mysticism in Indonesian Politics", in Robert Tillman ed. *Man, State, and Society in Southeast Asia*. New York, 1969, p 183.

13. Mitchell, "Communism, Mystics, and Sukarnoism", p 32.

14. Bernard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*, Ithaca, 1969, p 335.

15. Anderson, "Power", p 28 for reference to manunggal and the quote is from Mitchell, "Communism, Mystics and Sukarnoism", p 31.
16. James Peacock, Rites of Modernization, Chicago, 1968, p xvi.
17. Soedjatmoko, "Problems and Opportunities", pp 284-285.
18. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Boston, 1966, p 322.
19. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, Boston, 1969. pp 14, 33.
20. Thomas Merton, Zen and the Birds of Appetite, New York, 1968, p 140.
21. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p 113.
22. Norman O Brown, Life Against Death, Middletown, Conn, 1970, p 318.
23. Ibid. p 84.
24. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, New York, 1967, p 81 and Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p 136
25. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p ix and Brown, Life Against Death, p 47 where Brown agrees with Spinoza and Freud in the war against the notion of free will.
26. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p 112. Marcuse is citing hegel here.
27. Ibid. p 156.
28. Brown, Life Against Death, p 172.
29. Hegel, Phenomenology, p 89.
30. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p 163.
31. Brown, Life Against Death, p 247

32. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, p 116

33. Mao Tse-tung, *Quotations*, Peking, 1966, p 214.

34. Maurice Godelier, "System, Structure, and Contradiction in Capital", *The Socialist Register*, New York 1967. p 96 refers to Levi-Strauss.

35. Merleau-Ponty in *Humanism and Terror* suggests that the most we can know through analysis of social processes is a set of probabilities. He says on p 31 that "Since, in respect to the future, we have no other criterion than probability, the difference between a greater or lesser probability suffices as the basis of a political decision, but not to leave all the honor on one side and the dishonor on the other." He argues that Marxism does no more than give you a perspective from which to orient yourself toward reality (p 55) and that communists do not choose their end, but rather orient themselves around forces already at work (p 53).

36. Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture*, New York, 1969, pp 218, 232.

37. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, p 131

38. Brown, *Life Against Death*, p 34. Merleau-Ponty states in *Humanism and Terror* that (p xxiii) "Marx...did not mean to 'suppress' liberty, discussion, philosophy, and in general the values of individual conscience except by 'realizing' them in the life of everyone." So for Marx the revolution was not meant as a denial of individual consciousness, but in its fulfilment. Even the process of making the revolution was not meant as a denial. As Merleau-Ponty puts it again, (p 80) "to live 'and die for a future projected by desire rather than think and act in the present is precisely what Marxists have always considered utopianism,"

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